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ABSTRACT
A Legal and Philosophical Inquiry Into Affirmative Action
by
Shauna Allyn Donahue Van Buren
Dr. Jerry Simich, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of Political Science
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This thesis explores the controversial question of affirmative action in higher
education. The United States Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Grutier v. Bollinger, 539
U.S.—(2003) and Gratz v. Bollinger, 529 U.S. —(2003) is sparking a resurgence of
debate over the issue. Both Grutter and Gratz filed lawsuits claiming that the University
of Michigan affirmative action plan violated their right to equal protection of the laws
because it served as a form of reverse discrimination by considering race in the
admissions process. While the University of Michigan defended its use of affirmative
action in higher education by citing the need for a diverse campus which originated in
Justice Powell’s opinion m Regents o f the University o f California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978). The Supreme Court’s recent decision in these two cases has changed the nature
of affirmative action making it a policy that no longer focuses solely on race but instead,
looks at a variety of factors when deciding which applicants to admit.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: THE ORIGINS OF THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE
Issues such as gun control, abortion and affirmative action are guaranteed to spark
debate within society. However, unlike gun control and abortion, arguments over
affirmative action force people to recognize differences in race and ethnicity, making the
policy even more contentious. Although support or opposition for affirmative action is
not necessarily based along racial and ethnic lines, the discussion has remained
controversial since its implementation.

Part of the reason behind this is that both

proponents and opponents of affirmative action use the concepts of fairness and justice to
defend their arguments, which makes it difficult to find a consensus.

Another factor that

contributes to affirmative action’s divisive nature is its ability to affect those within
society. From higher education admissions to employment practices, affirmative action
has the potential to affect everyone. With the United States Supreme Court’s recent
decision regarding the policy in higher education, affirmative action has been brought to
the forefront as a significant policy question.
This thesis will explore the critical issue of affirmative action by looking at
several aspeets of the poliey. Chapter 1 will provide a brief history of the Civil Rights
Movement and the evolution of affirmative action. It will also outline popular arguments
expressed by proponents and opponents of the policy. Chapter 2 consists of summaries
of Supreme Court decisions pertaining to affirmative action in higher education and the

I
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workplace.

Chapter 3 looks at the most recent Supreme Court rulings involving

affirmative action in higher education.

Chapter 4 considers the question of justice

surrounding the general application of affirmative action. Originally through set-asides,
and quotas, affirmative action represented a general policy that considered only race and
ethnicity.

John Rawls’s A Theory o f Justice and arguments made by Ronald Dworkin

will be used to show how a general application can be considered just. By applying
Rawls’s hypothetical criterion, “justice as fairness’’ and his “difference principle” that
redistributes social goods such as higher education, to the least advantaged, I will
demonstrate how a general application of affirmative action can be viewed as just. To
evaluate Rawls’s arguments, I will apply Ronald Dworkin’s critique of “justice as
fairness.” Even though Dworkin does not agree with all of the elements within “justice
as fairness,” he supports affirmative action because of its “forward-looking” ability,
which centers on the future benefits of enrolling minority students.
The second and more current way affirmative action has been implemented is
through an individualized process, which looks at various qualities of each applicant.
Applying this approach Chapter 5, will examine Aristotle’s concept of equity. Aristotle
sees equity as correcting injustices, which more abstract and general policies had not
intended to create. I will argue that equity can be used to east a fresh light on how to
justify affirmative action by applying it to particular individuals who have been or
continue to be affected by racism (rather than simply applying one general policy to all
minorities). Aristotle’s notion of equity can be shown to be critical to the legal defense
of affirmative action because it allows the policy to be “flexible” and “individualized.”
Aristotle understood equity to be the most important part of justice because it modifies
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the general nature of law. This “flexible” and “individualized” approach is the foundation
behind equity because it corrects laws or policies so as to make them applicable in
specific situations, and thus more just.

Civil Rights and Affirmative Action
Since its inception affirmative action has been a widely debated topic.
Throughout society people have discussed the question of whether or not the policy fairly
addresses inequalities that minorities may face.

On one side are affirmative action

supporters who argue that the policy should be maintained because it addresses
discrimination in an equitable manner. On the other side, affirmative action opponents
contend that it disproportionately considers minority interests over the majority.
Nonetheless, affirmative action does not mark the first time racial inequality has been
confronted. From Reconstruction to the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, American
society has struggled with racial discrimination. The recent controversy over affirmative
action embodies the on-going difficulty of addressing racial inequality. By looking at the
history of the Civil Rights Movement and a few of the prevalent arguments on both sides
of the affirmative action debate, one can understand why the policy continues to divide
society into two groups - those who support it and those who do not.
Racial discrimination has beleaguered our nation since its founding.

Many

Americans continue to espouse racial prejudices and think nothing of such behavior,
while others view racial prejudice as wrong and seek its end. Elected officials have
attempted to legislate the issue by passing constitutional amendments and laws.
Lawmakers took action on the problem of racial prejudice for the first time after the Civil
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War. President Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, which freed
slaves, and left open the question of how to incorporate newly freed slaves into society.
Of course this proved difficult to answer because the United States was so divided on the
issue that Americans fought a war over slavery. Moreover, slavery so greatly separated
the nation that Radieal Republicans attempted to impeach President Andrew Johnson
because of his veto of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The Act, which eventually became
law, states:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
rights in every state and territory, to make and enforee, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens
(Leiter 2002, 24).
Leading the fight for civil rights were Radical Republicans who controlled Congress and
ensured that a series of amendments to the Constitution were adopted. First, the
Thirteenth Amendment was passed in 1865, which abolished slavery. Three years later,
the Fourteenth Amendment declared all American bom persons national and state
citizens, and prohibited state violation of three general groupings o f civil rights
(privileges or immunities, equal protection, and due process) (Leiter 2002, 24). Finally in
1889, Congress passed the Fifteenth Amendment, which guaranteed to every male citizen
over twenty-one years of age the right to vote, regardless of race, color, creed, national
origin or previous condition of slavery (Krantz 2002, 6). Together the three constitutional
amendments bestowed rights to black males that were once given only to white males.
Even though positive steps were being made, there were groups strongly opposed
to the movement towards racial equality and who fought to prevent it at all costs. The Ku
Klux Klan began a series of violent protests against racial equality by murdering blacks
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and destroying their homes and churches.

Jim Crow laws also barred blacks from

equality by establishing separate facilities in education, employment and publie
accommodations. One author described the opposition to the Civil Rights Movement as:
To maintain and underscore its absolute supremacy, the white South
systematically disenfranchised black men, imposed rigid patterns of racial
segregation, manipulated the judicial system and sustained extraordinary
levels of violence and brutality (Leiter 2002, 30).
Jim Crow laws created such a discriminatory society that the affects could be seen nearly
a century later. For example, in 1964, the average state expenditure in Mississippi for
edueation was just $21.77 per black pupil as compared to $81.86 for every white pupil
(McAdam 1998, 25). “Even though the goal of Reeonstruction was to give Negroes full
citizenship, eivil rights and the ballot, and get white men accustomed to treating Negroes
as equals, at least politically and legally... in effect to revolutionize the relations of the
two races it failed to be achieved” (Leiter 2002, 27). Simply by looking at the difference
in per pupil spending in 1964, one can conclude that racial discrimination remained after
Reconstruction.

So what prohibited Radical Republicans from achieving their goal?

White supremacy groups gained momentum and Jim Crow laws helped instill racial
prejudice through local law enforcement.

The political turning point for Radical

Republicans and civil rights took place in the 1876 presidential election.

With the

Electoral College split, Rutherford Hayes, the Radical Republican candidate, promised to
remove Union soldiers from the South if elected.

The withdrawal of Union soldiers

provided white supremaeists the ability to im pose their w ill through any m eans, w hich

usually took the form of violence and intimidation. More importantly, although the deal
gave Hayes the presidency, it also marked the demise of the Civil Rights Movement
following the Civil War.
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Civil Rights Revisited
Since the end of Reconstruction, nearly a eentury earlier. Congress had failed to
enact any but the most feeble legislation against racial discrimination (Grofman 2000, 9).
The tide began to change in 1954 with the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board
o f Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954). This decision overturned Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896) that established the “separate but equal” doetrine. In Brown, the Court
ruled that separate facilities [in education] are inherently unequal (Kranz 2002, 14).
Advancing the civil rights movement further. President John F. Kermedy issued
Exeeutive Order 10925 on March 6, 1961, that mandated federal eontraetors take
affirmative action to ensure minority applicants are employed, and employees are treated
during employment without regard to race, creed, eolor or national origin (Schuck 2002,
64). The exeeutive order coined the phrase ‘affirmative action,’ which meant that from
this point forward any law or policy that sought racial equality in employment and higher
education became analogous with the term. Numerous presidential executive orders and
protests led by Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. helped the Civil Rights Movement gain
additional momentum. An important event took place in the spring of 1963 when King
led protests that were retaliated against violently by the Birmingham, Alabama, poliee.
Pictures of peaceful marchers, many of them schoolchildren, being met with fire hoses
and attaek dogs were spread across front pages throughout the country and showed each
evening on national television (Grofman 2000, 12). This brought the brutal struggle for
civil rights into the homes of those who may not have experienced it otherwise.
Throughout the country awareness increased and so did pressure on Congress to end
violence in the South. Less than a year after Kennedy’s death. President Lyndon Johnson
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signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into law. It implemented a set of laws banning
discrimination in public accommodations involved in interstate commerce, federally
funded programs, and in employment by federal and private employers (Kranz 2002, 15).
The act declared a strong legislative policy against discrimination in public schools and
colleges, seeking to end segregation. “Title VI of the Civil Rights Act prohibited
discrimination in federally funded programs and Title VII barred employment
discrimination on the grounds of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” (Francis
1993, 13).

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provided a legislative mandate for the

implementation of affirmative aetion plans nationwide and led to a soeiety divided by
support or opposition to the poliey.
Because of the Supreme Court’s recent decision involving affirmative action in
higher education, much of the discussion currently centers on that issue. In Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. — (2003), a white Michigan resident, Barbara Grutter, after being
denied admission into the University of Miehigan Law School, filed a lawsuit claiming
that its affirmative action plan violated her right to equal protection of laws under the
Fourteenth Amendment. She argued that she was rejected because the affirmative action
plan used race as the “predominant factor,” giving applicants belonging to certain
minority groups an increased opportunity for admission. The Court ruled that the law
sehool’s affirmative action plan was constitutional on the grounds that its goal of
diversity represented a compelling state interest. The majority opinion in Grutter applied
Justice Lewis Powell’s diversity opinion in University o f California v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978) as its precedent. Despite the Supreme Court’s recent support of affirmative
action in higher edueation, society remains deeply divided over the policy.
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Many

questions eontinue to surround the issue of affirmative action, such as: does the policy
provide an unfair advantage for minorities? Is affirmative action an important policy that
helps elose the eeonomic gap between whites and blacks? Does diversity represent a
critical goal for college campuses? The answers to such vital questions likely depend on
whether or not one supports affirmative action. In general, arguments from the left tend
to defend the use of affirmative action in higher education while those from the right
argue against the policy. By looking at arguments from the left and the right, one can see
why affirmative action in higher education remains such a divisive policy.

Arguments Supporting Affirmative Action: Social and Economic Gap
For affirmative aetion advocates unequal soeial and economic conditions play an
important role in defending the policy. Many refer to statistics that show differences in
these conditions that tend to benefit other races or ethnicities over minorities.

With

regard to social conditions, social scientist Elijah Anderson has described the inner eity
problems that blacks face:
The inclination to violence springs from the circumstanees of life among
the ghetto poor - the lack of jobs that pay a living wage, limited basic
services (police response in emergencies, building maintenance, trash pick
up, lighting and other services that middle class neighborhoods take for
granted), the stigma of race, the fallout from rampant drug use and drug
trafficking, and the resulting alienation and absence of hope for the future
(Anderson 1999, 32).
Anderson argues that blacks in the inner city are faced with a series of complex problems
that must be addressed. Other social scientists have also related poverty conditions to
those of racially divided communities. For example, Douglas S. Massey has written that
poverty and racial concentration are mutually reinforcing and cumulative, leading
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directly to the creation of underclass communities typified by high rates of family
disruption, welfare dependence, crime, mortality and educational failure (Greenburg
2002, 20). The limited number of living wage positions created in these communities,
which tend to be racially divided, perpetuates this kind of social condition. Those who
support this defense of affirmative action ask one to imagine being forced to live in a
community where violence and crime are regular occurrences and leaving is practically
impossible because of the low paying job one is forced to accept. Essentially, this type of
social condition creates a vicious cycle that makes it difficult to escape.
Research regarding economic inequalities also shows lines that tend to be drawn
racially. For example, “in 1998 only 68% of black men were likely to be working, a
proportion lower than that of any other racial group” (Greenburg 2002, 19). Those that
were employed tended to be in lower paying jobs, which is reflected in the variance of
annual household income. “In 1998, the annual median household income for blacks was
the lowest (about $25,100) compared with Asians ($45,400) and whites ($40,600)”
(Greenburg 2002, 19).

By 2000, the median household incomes refleeted the same

economic disparity; “blacks had the lowest ($30,447) contrasted with Hispanics
($33,447), whites ($45,904) and Asians” ($55,521) (Money Income in the United States
2000, 5). This translates into a reduced ability to purchase items such as a house or
computer.

Using median household income data from 1998, “72% of whites owned

homes compared to approximately 40% of blaeks and Hispanics” (Greenburg 2002, 19).
Moreover, one-half of white households in 1999 owned a computer or were connected to
the Internet compared to one-quarter of blacks (Greenburg 2002, 19).
“Blacks in the Economy,”
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According to

The economic fortunes of blacks are strongly tied (more so than whites) to
a strong economy and vigorously enforced policies against discrimination.
Without these conditions, the black middle class may persist, but it is
doubtful it can grow or thrive. And the position of lower status blaeks
carmot be expected to improve (Killian 1990, 7).
This type of disproportionate data provides evidence to affirmative action advocates that
social and economic conditions are the equivalent to racial inequality beeause
inconsistencies are divided by race.

Supporters who use this argument propose that

affirmative action in higher education is needed to increase educational opportunities so
that minorities have the ability to improve their social and economic conditions.
Compensation
A second argument supporting affirmative action involves compensatory justice.
Those who advocate this viewpoint claim that because certain races eontinue to feel the
affect of discrimination, compensation in the form of affirmative action is needed. Judith
Jarvis Thompson maintains that:
Many [white males] have been direct beneficiaries of policies which have
down-graded blaeks and women...and even those who did not directly
benefit...had, at any rate, the advantage in competition which comes of
the confidence in one’s full membership [in the community], and of one’s
right being recognized as a matter of course (Pojman 2003, 23).
Jarvis suggests that members of the majority have gained advantages over minorities
simply because they have always been able to participate within the system.
Aecordingly, the inability of certain members to actively engage within society justifies
the use of policies such as affirmative action. So who should be held accountable for
discrimination? As Alison Jaggar puts it, “everyone who acquiesces in a racist and sexist
system helps to cause discrimination”(Amdur 1979, 231). On the other hand, Robert
Fullinwider posits that those who have voluntarily benefited from discrimination are

10
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responsible for it (Amdur 1979, 231). Onee responsibility is established compensatory
supporters turn to the discussion of who will perform the compensation. Fullinwider
argues that only those individuals who have practiced discrimination should be
responsible for compensation.

In contrast, Jaggar maintains everyone within society

should compensate because everyone has participated in a variety of soeial and economic
practices that tend to create inferior positions for minorities (Amdur 1979, 231). Overall,
those who support compensatory justice assert that affirmative action is needed to serve
as a means of compensation for the inequalities experienced by minorities.
Diversity
Today, the most popular justification for affirmative aetion is the diversity
rationale. Justice Powell noted the need for diversity in his Bakke opinion and since then,
affirmative action plans have been revised to focus on diversity rather than quotas or
goals for minority enrollment in higher edueation. Those who support diversity assert
that it is an important component of education because it exposes students to different
viewpoints and experiences. The diversity argument has gained momentum since the
Supreme Court decision in Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) that upheld affirmative action at
the University of Michigan because of its focus on diversity. However, interest in the
diversity rationale increased after a 1998 study by William Bowen and Derek Bok, the
former presidents of Princeton and Harvard, respectively, was published. Titled A Shape
o f a River, the study is based on the academic records of 80,000 students who entered 28
selective institutions.
Bowen and Bok found that large majorities, especially among blacks in
the more recent cohorts, thought that it was important or very important in
life, “to work effectively and get along well with people from different
races and cultures,” and that their college educations helped to cultivate

11

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

this ability to a significant degrees. They also found that the more blacks
in an entering class, the more likely (56%) that white students in that class
would know two or more black students well, and that percentage
increased with the schools selectivity. These interactions occurred,
moreover, even though black students represented fewer than 10% of the
students in the schools studied (Shuck 2002, 31).
This proved to be groundbreaking research because it gave diversity advocates the
empirical justification needed to defend affirmative action in higher education. The data
show that the more diverse a campus is, the more likely it is that interactions with other
racial or ethnic groups will occur. More importantly, the Grutter decision upholding
affirmative action on account of diversity provides the legal backing necessary for the
implementation of the policy in higher education. Michael Selmi explains:
Diversity has quite clearly become the most heralded of all justifications
for affirmative action. In large part, this is because relying on diversity
rather than discrimination places affirmative action programs on more
solid legal and perhaps political grounds (Shuck 2002, 31).
This argument is popular because it encourages diversity rather than focusing on a
specific race and making a decision to admit or reject a student solely based on skin
color. Affirmative action plans have been deemed constitutional based on the diversity
rationale, thus making it one of the leading justifications behind arguments supporting
affirmative action in higher education.

Arguments Against Affirmative Action: Colorblind
The concept of a “colorblind” society originated in Justice John M. Harlan’s
dissent’m Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Justice Harlan wrote.
There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind and neither knows
nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens
are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful.
The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or

12
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of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the
land are involved (Berry 1996, 138).
In Plessy, the Court upheld a Louisiana statute, passed in 1890, which provided for
separate railway earriages for white and colored races (Goring 2000, 4). Through Plessy
and other Supreme Court decisions, the notion of a “colorblind” society has become an
integral argument against affirmative action.

Advocates of a “colorblind” society

maintain:
Because race really is, and properly only would be, a matter of unchosen
appearance concerning skin hue, hair texture, and the like, there is and
would continue to be an awareness of those natural, superficial differences
in appearance pertaining to features such as eye color or height. Given
this understanding of racial identity, any person’s race is and properly
should be irrelevant in and for virtually all social contexts for the same
reasons that differences in eye color or height are also largely irrelevant
(Wasserstrom 1995, 163).
Aeeording to those who support a “colorblind” society, it is important that distinctions
based on race be proscribed. A colorblind society will achieve the equal protection of
laws, which is guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

From a

eonstitutional standpoint, these issues play out under the mandate - expressly applicable
to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and made applicable
to the federal government by the Supreme Court via the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause, which requires that all governmental entities provide all citizens the equal
protection of laws (Cokorinos 2003, 4). Recently, “colorblind” supporters received a
slight set-back in California when Proposition 54, The Racial Privacy Initiative, failed to
pass in fall of 2003. The proposition stated:
Effective January 1, 2005 prohibits state, and local governments from
using race, ethnicity, color, or national origin to classify current or
prospective students, contractors, or employees in public education,
contracting or employment operations. Does not prohibit classification by

13

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

sex. Exemptions include: law enforcement descriptions, prisoner and
undercover assignments, action taken to maintain federal funding
(Proposition 209 2003).
The initiative represents the growing support to end racial distinctions so that a
“colorblind” society is attained.

Interestingly, additional defense of a “colorblind”

society has also come from the left. For example, Bayard Rustin, a civil rights leader
during the 1960s, claimed that we need a political and social reform program that will not
only help blacks but one that will help all Americans (Skrenty 1996, 31).

The

“eolorblind” argument from the left has broad appeal beeause it advocates solving
inequalities for all Americans rather than concentrating on minorities.

“Colorblind”

advocates desire a society where race no longer plays a role. Hence, affirmative action
would be prohibited because of its use of racial distinctions.
Merit
Opponents of affirmative action often claim that the poliey devalues merit, which
typically translates into high standardized test scores. Meritocraey is founded on the
argument that students with the highest test scores deserve admission into college. Most
advocates use the definition of merit found in dietionaries that recognize at least three
senses of merit: (a) the state, fact or quality of deserving well; (b) something deserving
reward, praise, gratitude; (c) worth, value, excellence (Davis 1983, 349). Meritocracy
supporters assert that the second definition accurately applies to merit because only
ability and achievement deserve reward, which means race, is irrelevant.
The notion of meritocracy dictates that:
Individuals will be motivated to develop their skills only if they are
rewarded by differential status and differential income. IQ beeomes the
basis of qualification for entrance... and education becomes the certifying

14
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agency, success reflects natural superiority developed through effort and
measured by technical competence (Livingston 1979, 123).
For meritocracy advocates, affirmative aetion is wrong because it fails to focus on
specific test scores for admission. A student who has worked hard to score high on SAT
or LSAT exams should gain admission over another who may have not scored as well,
but is admitted because of skin color. Meritocracy defenders point to the lowering of
standards as a main reason why affirmative action is wrong. Christopher Jencks and
Meredith Phillips have found that the typical American black student scored lower than
75% of his white counterparts on most standardized tests for admission into college, law
school, medical school and business school (Greenburg 2002, 4). Statistics such as these
are used to show that affirmative action decreases admission standards by accepting
minorities who have lower test scores. Meritocracy advocates argue that test scores show
how hard one is willing to work to get ahead, while race is something that one is bom
with. Accordingly, affirmative action does not consider the achievements of individuals
because the policy is unfairly concerned with race. Meritocracy is closely tied to the
American capitalist idea that encourages the possibility for everyone to be successful as
long as they are willing to work hard. Giving one an advantage simply because of one’s
race is unfair and should not occur.

For meritocracy supporters, the importance of

working hard to get ahead cannot be placed behind a policy such as affirmative action,
which looks at race above hard work. The land of opportunity was thus meritocratic:
one deserved all that one could attain by talent and industry (Skrenty 1996, 27).

Generally, those who use the meritocracy defense do not support affirmative action
because o f its failure to reward based strictly upon merit.

15
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Reverse Discrimination
The daim of reverse discrimination linked to affirmative aetion has become a
leading argument against the policy. The eharge of reverse discrimination rests on the
implicit premise that whites are denied access to advantages to which they are entitled,
and which they would have obtained had not preference been given to minorities
(Livingston 1979, 40).

Reverse discrimination was the basis for Barbara Grutter’s

lawsuit against the University of Miehigan Law School.
When the Law School denied admission to Grutter, a white Michigan
resident with a 3.8 GPA and 161 LSAT score, she filed suit, alleging that
she had been discriminated against on the basis of race. She argued her
rejection occurred because the Law School uses race as a predominant
factor giving minority groups a significantly greater ehance of admission
than students with similar credentials from disfavored groups (539 U.S.—
2003,9).
Grutter maintained that beeause she had higher scores than the minorities that were
accepted into the program, the law school discriminated against her on the basis of race.
Reverse discrimination advocates argue that by favoring minorities, the affirmative action
plan discriminates against the majority. In Grutter, a qualified member of the majority
was denied admission while a less qualified minority was admitted which depicts the
perfect illustration of how affirmative action is reverse diserimination. The Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of equal protection of laws are cited as proof that
race-centered policies violate the Constitution. Ward Connerly has led the fight against
affirmative action as reverse discrimination by contending that ending race-based
affirmative action is a conservative principle because preferences are unfair and against
the spirit of the Constitution (Pincus 2003, 55). Those who defend the premise that
affirmative action serves as reverse discrimination adduce that discrimination is
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unconstitutional.

If past discrimination is unjust, so is discrimination against whites

(Livingston 1979, 29).
Put simply, the objection is that the eurrent beneficiaries of reverse
discrimination are not often the same persons as those who were harmed
by the original discrimination, and those who now bear the burden of
reverse diserimination are seldom the same persons as those who practieed
the original discrimination (Sher 1979, 82).
Therefore, affirmative action in today’s society does not necessarily help those who were
harmed by discrimination prior to the I960’s Civil Rights Movement.

Moreover,

affirmative action is wrong because it discriminates against those who are not responsible
for past discrimination. Overall, reverse discrimination arguments assert that affirmative
aetion is unjust because it creates a situation where the majority is discriminated against
simply because of skin color.

Where Does Affirmative Action Go From Here?
Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) represents a significant success for affirmative action
in higher education.

By upholding the affirmative action plan at the University of

Michigan Law School, the Supreme Court provided unpreeedented legal support that it
had not shown since Bakke. The Court validated the affirmative action plan because of
its flexible and subjective nature.

The Grutter decision is a milestone for several

different reasons. First, it represents the most reeent Supreme Court decision regarding
the constitutionality of affirmative action in higher education. Second, by upholding the
law school plan, other universities are able to revise their affirmative aetion plans to
mirror Michigan’s. Finally, the decision enables affirmative action to remain in higher
education, which is seen as a victory by those who continue to support the policy.
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However, affirmative action opponents are not without victories of their own.

In

California, Texas and Washington affirmative action has been restricted in higher
education. It seems that arguments for and against affirmative action play an important
role in its success or failure.

The Court may have been able to determine the

constitutionality of affirmative action, but its 5-4 ruling epitomizes the same divisions
that exist within society. Attitudes and opinions toward affirmative action are driven by
how one wishes to perceive the facts. Those who support or oppose the policy cite
statistics that reinforce their position. Just like any other highly debated policy, finding a
middle ground for affirmative action is difficult. For instance, some affirmative action
advocates claim that a “critical mass” is too vague and will not fully address the
inequalities that exist among minorities.

Meanwhile other supporters may see the

decision as a victory because it found affirmative action plans constitutional. On the
complete opposite end of the spectrum are those who oppose any consideration of race in
higher education. The various opinions on the issue of affirmative action most likely
stem from the diverse viewpoints within society. These viewpoints can lead a person to
conclude that the future of affirmative action will likely be as controversial as its past.
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CHAPTER 2

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS REGARDING AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION
Most of the revisions to affirmative action are due to Supreme Court decisions.
Both support and opposition to the policy by the Court has changed the way affirmative
action has been implemented. In fact, the numerous decisions for and against the policy
have greatly contributed to the manner affirmative action is applied today. While not all
of the following cases pertain to affirmative action in higher education, they represent
landmark decisions involving the policy.

Decisions In Support of Affirmative Action: Griggs v.
Duke Power Company
The first time the United States Supreme Court made a decision regarding an
affirmative action plan was in Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Before passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Duke Power Company allowed black
employees to work only in the Coal Department. The revised policy required a high
school diploma or the passage of a standardized intelligence test for promotion to higher
paying jobs outside of its Coal Department. The policy no longer limited blacks to a
single department, but it did require a diploma or the passage of a test for any type of
promotion.

In response, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored

19

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

People (NAACP) filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of Duke Power Company’s black
workers, challenging the qualifications for promotion as a violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act. The question before the Court was whether Title VII prohibited this
policy when it was not significantly related to job performance, as it disqualified blacks
at a higher rate than whites and the jobs had previously been reserved for whites (Greene
1989,64).
In an 8-0 decision, the Supreme Court determined Duke’s promotion policy was
unconstitutional

and established the

acknowledged,

“some

employment

“disparate
practices

impaet” theory.
adopted

without

The theory
a

deliberately

discriminatory motive, may in operation be functionally equivalent to intentional
discrimination” (Pattison and Varca 1996, 3). The Court based its decision that Duke
Power Company’s test was discriminatory by reviewing North Carolina’s census data.
Research found that 34% of white males had completed high school and only 12% of
blacks had done so (Raza and Anderson 1999, 20).

The Court concluded that the

overwhelming disparity between white and black high school graduates constituted an
unfair requirement by Duke. In Griggs, the justices rejeeted Duke’s argument that Title
VII allowed employers “to give and act upon the results of any professionally developed
ability test, as long as the test is not intended or used to discriminate because of race”
(Raza and Anderson 1999, 20). The Court demonstrated its support for affirmative action
by stating “...that the objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII was to achieve
equal employment opportunities and remove discriminatory barriers” (Hernandez 1986,
4). Its support of affirmative action was shown in the application of the “disparate
impact” theory, which changed the nature of the policy. From this point forward, adverse
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affect was identified by racial imbalances and affirmative action was implemented to help
correct these imbalances.
Griggs established that a company’s failure to hire a workforce similar to the
racial composition of the local, qualified pool of candidates violated the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. Evolving from the Griggs decision was the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s creation of the Uniform Guidelines on Employment Selection Procedures.
The newly enacted policy stated that any group, which is less than 4/5ths of the rate of
the highest group, was considered adversely affected. Even though the EEOC’s 4/5ths
policy was termed by the agency as only a “rule of thumb” most employers feared the
consequences of not following the guideline. The central aim of the guideline was to
achieve racial equality in the workplace by employing those groups who do not have
comparable representation in the workplace.
Regents o f the University o f California v. Bakke
As private and public agencies throughout the nation began to revise their
affirmative action programs, many white males began to sue for reverse discrimination.
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 138 U.S. 265 (1978), was the first time
the issue of reverse discrimination was considered. The plaintiff, a while male named
Allan Bakke, had been denied admission to the medical school at the University of
California at Davis. The school had a special admissions program in which a specific
number of positions were set-aside for minority students. Bakke claimed that he was
more qualified than some of the minority candidates selected under the set-aside.
Further, he maintained that the quota prevented his admission by restricting the number
of positions available to white students. Bakke challenged the university’s affirmative
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action program as a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of
laws. In response, the university defended itself by citing that “ ...an applicant’s race is
reasonably good proxy for an assured characteristic, i.e., willingness to provide medical
services for underserved areas”(Alt 1997, 89). The issue of affirmative action in higher
education proved difficult for the Court to resolve. The Supreme Court’s decision in
Bakke was considered:
...a prime example of the divisiveness and fragmentation that has
characterized the Supreme Court’s handling of affirmative action cases.
Not only did the Court in Bakke fail to produce a majority opinion, but
also it did not even manage to muster a single majority in support of its
decision (Rosenfeld 1991, 68).
In its 5-4 decision, the justices were divided into three groups: one group of four
who refused to address the constitutionality of affirmative action, another group of four
who believed that the constitutionality of affirmative action should be addressed, and
Justice Powell who sided with both groups on two separate issues. The first group of
justices concluded that the Davis program violated statutory law and therefore, they did
not feel the need to rule on the constitutionality of the program.

The second group

determined that the university’s program was constitutional and should be upheld.
Finally, Justice Powell sided with the second group because he believed that not all racial
classifications were unconstitutional. However, he also sided with the first group because
he held that the university’s quota violated both statutory law and the Constitution.
Justice Powell “...could find no substantial interest that justified establishment of the
University’s specific quota system” (Witt and Gottron 1990, 604). He ruled that the
university’s goal to remedy past discrimination was not a valid justification because
“.. .such a desire was based on an amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in its

22

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

reach into the past” (Witt and Gottron 1990, 604.). This compelled Powell to side with
the first group, giving the majority a narrow edge in its conclusion that the university’s
plan was unconstitutional, leading to Bakke’s admission into medical school.
According to Powell, the university’s program violated Bakke’s equal protection
rights because the affirmative action plan completely barred majority students from
competing for any of the positions held specifically for minority students. Furthermore,
Powell noted that the university did not have a history of prior discrimination, which
meant it had no compelling state interest to implement an affirmative action plan.
Powell’s opinion did not reject the use of race-based preference by a university without
prior discrimination, but he did deny the use of quotas. More importantly, he explained
that diversity within the university provides, “academic freedom and the promotion of
robust exchange of ideas” (Alt 1997, 190). Justice Powell referred to Harvard’s plan as
an example of a constitutional affirmative action plan. It gave full consideration to all
individuals, with race counting as one of the many aspects in the admission process
making it a “plus factor.” However Harvard deemed other factors were regarded
important including clubs, sports and community activities. In Bakke the Court struck
down the university’s minority preference policy structured around quotas while Powell’s
diversity opinion provided support for affirmative action founded on the need for a
diverse university campus.
United Steelworkers o f American, AFL-CIO v. Weber
United Steelworkers o f America, AFL-CIO v. Weber 443 U.S. 193 (1979),
presented another reverse discrimination challenge to an affirmative action plan that
permitted a private union. United Steelworkers of America, and a private employer.
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Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, to adopt a voluntary, race-conscious
affirmative action plan. To address an imbalance of white craft workers to black craft
workers at Kaiser, the company and the union entered a collective bargaining agreement
that established an affirmative action program. The imparity occurred because, prior to
1974, blacks were not provided a training opportunity for promotion to skilled craft
worker positions. As a result, only 5 of the 273 skilled craftspeople were blacks in 1974
(Greene 1989, 25). “The agreed upon plan reserved 50% of the openings in an in-plant
craft-training program for blacks until the percentage of black craft workers in the plant
approximated the percentage of blacks in the local labor force” (Greene 1989, 25).
During its first year, the program had thirteen employees, seven were black, and six were
white (Greene 1989, 25). Several of the black employees chosen had less seniority than
Brian Weber and other white employees who were not admitted into the program. Weber
sued claiming that the affirmative action plan was a violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act. The district court ruled in favor of Weber and the court of appeals affirmed
its decision.
The AFL-CIO appealed the case to the Supreme Court. The decision was 5-2
with Justices Powell and John Paul Stevens not participating.

According to Justice

William Brennan’s majority opinion, the issue before the Court was “whether Title VII
forbids private employers and unions from voluntarily agreeing upon boneafide
affirmative action plans that accord racial preferences in the manner and for the purpose
provided in the Kaiser-USWA plan” (Patterson 1999, 2). The majority of the Court
concluded that Title VII did not forbid employers from agreeing on voluntary affirmative
action plans. “The Court determined rather, that Congress enacted Title VII in response
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to concerns throughout the country regarding historical racial inequity from one century
to the next”(Patterson 1999, 2). It then considered whether the plan violated Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. First, the Court concluded that the plan had the same goal
of the Civil Rights Act because both were established to eliminate racial discrimination
and second, it measured if the plan “unnecessarily trammeled the interests of white
employees” (Patterson 1999, 3)
The majority concluded that the affirmative action plan did not inhibit the ability
of white employees because there were no layoffs and whites had the same opportunity as
blacks to be chosen for the training. It upheld Kaiser’s plan noting that “the plan and
Title VII shared the common purposes of breaking down old patterns of racial
segregation and hierarchy and opening employment opportunity for Negro’s in
occupations which had traditionally been closed to them”(McGinely 1997, 3).

Decisions Against Affirmative Action: City o f Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Several changes took place that altered the Court’s approach to affirmative action.
The election of a conservative president in 1980 and the appointment of conservative
Supreme Court justices resulted in a more narrow view of affirmative action from this
point forward. In 1986, the Supreme Court’s conservative shift was reinforced when
William Rehnquist became Chief Justice.

This change was illustrated in City o f

Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989), which was one of the first cases that
limited the scope of affirmative action. The Court’s decision was a turning point for
affirmative action plans nationwide. In 1983, the Richmond City Council established an
affirmative action plan to help the hiring of minority construction contractors. Titled the
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“Minority Business Utilization Plan,” it mandated that businesses receiving contracts
from the city were forced to subcontract at least 30% of their dollar amount [from the
city] to minority businesses. However, minority businesses that won city contracts were
not forced to subcontract 30% of their dollar amount to other minority businesses.
Richmond argued that the implementation of its affirmative action plan would promote
more participation by minority contractors.

After the city rejected a bid from J.A.

Croson, a white contractor, for “noncompliance with the set-aside, Croson brought suit
claiming that the set-aside discriminated against him based on his race in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”( Rogers 1991, 3).
The court of appeals ruled the set-aside unconstitutional and the City of
Richmond appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the court of appeals judgment.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, in the majority opinion wrote that the “City Council
lacked the authority that Congress possessed under section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment to enact a set-aside without specific findings of discrimination” (Rogers
1991, 3). O’Connor noted that the Fourteenth Amendment “places clear limits on the
states’ use of race as a criterion for legislative action” (Rogers 1991, 3). She “concluded
that strict scrutiny was necessary to smoke out illegitimate uses of race by assuring that
the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant the use of a highly
suspect tool”(Chang 1997, 69).
After strictly scrutinizing the set-aside program, the Supreme Court ruled that the
City of Richmond had not shown a compelling government interest to end the present
effect of past discrimination. It found no evidence that the city had discriminated against
minorities nor was there evidence that past discrimination presently affected minorities.
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Without a remedial justification for the plan, the majority of the Court determined the
affirmative action plan was unconstitutional. It concluded that a 30% quota did not
represent a specific goal, but instead a “completely unrealistic assumption that minorities
will choose a particular trade in lockstep proportion to their representation in the local
population”(Green 2000, 315).
In Croson, the Supreme Court implemented a new guideline for the establishment
of set-aside programs. It forced state and local governments to “establish the existence of
prior discrimination and then narrowly tailor the program to meet the specific
situation”(Urofsky 1997, 175). As a result, ‘'''Croson severely limited the scope of
permissible affirmative action by applying strict scrutiny and strongly suggesting both
that remedial purpose and substantial evidence would be required” (Chang 1997, 71).
Even though this decision applied only to local and state affirmative action programs, the
development o f the strict scrutiny test restricted the use o f affirmative action to those
governmental agencies that had exhibited current or past discrimination.
Adarand Constructors v. Pena
Six years after Croson, the Supreme Court extended the use of strict scrutiny to
the federal government in Adarand Contractors Incorporated v. Pena, Secretary o f
Transportation, et al, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Since 1989, the United States Department of
Transportation awarded the prime contract for construction of a Colorado highway to
Mountain Gravel and Construction Company.

The Department of Transportation

affirmative action policy:
...established by the Small Business Act and the Surface Transportation
Act, provided financial incentives for general contractors to hire
subcontractors who were socially and economically disadvantaged, by
giving general contractors a bonus equal to ten percent of the value of any
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subcontracts that they awarded to disadvantaged subcontractors (Spann
2000, 53).
Mountain Gravel solicited bids from two subcontractors, Gonzales Construction
Company and Adarand Constructors, Inc.

Adarand submitted the lowest bid, but

Gonzales, a minority subcontractor, was awarded the contract. Adarand filed a lawsuit
alleging that the Department of Transportation affirmative action plan, which awarded a
bonus for hiring minority subcontractors, was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause.
In a 5-4 decision the Court ruled in favor of Adarand, reinforcing its position that
when considering the constitutionality of racial preferences that allegedly violate the
Equal Protection Clause, strict scrutiny must be applied. “We hold today that all racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state or local government actor, must be
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny” (Spann 2000, 53). Strict scrutiny
mandated that all levels of government must formulate affirmative action plans that
would meet its rigid standards. In its opinion, the Court listed three main obligations that
must be reviewed when looking at racial classifications.

The first was skepticism,

meaning that racial classifications had to be subjected to strict scrutiny. Second,
consistency, meaning that the equal protection guarantee of the Constitution extended to
the white majority as well as to racial minorities (Spann 2000, 53). Third, the precedents
established the principle of congruence, meaning that the requisite strict scrutiny standard
applied equally to state classifications under the Fourteenth Amendment and federal
classifications under the Fifth Amendment (Spann 2000, 53).

Taken together, the

preceding propositions essentially meant that every person has the right to equal
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protection, but unequal protection would be reviewed under the strictest judicial scrutiny.
By applying this test, the Court made it more difficult to enact affirmative action plans.
Hopwood V. Texas
Interestingly, it would be the Supreme Court’s refusal to consider a case that
would make an impact on affirmative action in higher education that it had not
experienced since Bakke. Hopwood v. State o f Texas, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996), involved the
University of Texas Law School affirmative action plan, which maintained a goal of
achieving a student body composed of 5% blacks and 10% Mexican Americans (Raza
1999, 52). Applications from minorities were considered by a minority admissions
subcommittee and were not compared with non-minority applicants. In 1992, four white
applicants, including Cheryl J. Hopwood, were denied admission into the law school.
The students argued that their LSATs and GPAs were much higher than minorities
accepted into the program.

The four rejected applicants filed a suit in district court,

contending that the law school’s admissions policy violated their Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection rights. The district court concluded that the school had not violated the
plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendments rights (Cole and Raymond 1997, 776). The judge
ruled “affirmative action programs are still needed in our society and therefore,
universities may legitimately consider race and ethnicity as one factor in their admission
policies” (Raza 1999, 53). The district court agreed with the university’s defense of its
affirmative action plan by citing that Texas still suffered from the affects of past
discrimination.
On March 18,1996, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the
case and concluded that “the ultimate objective of the Equal Protection Clause of the
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Fourteenth Amendment is to eliminate race-conscious decision making in the U.S.
society and legal culture”(Cole and Raymond 1995, 267). The Fifth Circuit reversed the
district court’s decision citing that the Supreme Court had required that strict scrutiny
must apply to all government racial classifications in its Adarand decision. Using strict
scrutiny, the circuit court considered two questions. Did the racial classification serve a
compelling state interest and was the affirmative action plan established to achieve that
goal? To answer the first question the circuit court referred to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Bakke. “The Fifth Circuit found that promotion of diversity as a government
interest had never gained enough adherents to the Supreme Court to become law” (Chang
1997, 73). The circuit court then considered if Justice Powell’s compelling state interest
in diversity served as binding precedent. Because his argument garnered only one vote his own, this opinion did not represent the viewpoint of the majority of the Supreme
Court.

Therefore, the circuit court concluded that the university did not have a

compelling state interest to implement its affirmative action plan.

The Court then

considered if the University of Texas Law School’s affirmative action plan served the
purpose of achieving the goal of addressing remedies. The Court found that “the purpose
was not remedial because the law school had failed to show any present effects of past
discrimination by the law school itself’ (Cole and Raymond 1997, 776). The circuit court
deemed the law school affirmative action plan unconstitutional and stated, “Race-based
remedies must be narrowly tailored and thus limited to the specific state actor” (Alt 1997,
194). As the University Texas discovered, defending affirmative action under the strict
scrutiny test was a very difficult task indeed.
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In June 1996, the law school filed a petition to the Supreme Court for review of
the decision. A single paragraph written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg stated.
The Court had denied the review because of the absence of live
controversy. We must await a final judgment on a program genuinely in
controversy before addressing the important question raised in this
petition”(Carter and Johnson 1997, 235).
The Court found no controversy because the law school had already acknowledged that
its plan was unconstitutional and proscribed its use. This left standing the Fifth Circuit
Court’s ruling invalidating affirmative action plans in its jurisdiction of Texas, Louisiana
and Mississippi leaving a question mark on its future.
Following the Court’s refusal to hear Hopwood, many states outside the
jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit began to place initiatives on the ballot urging voters to
prohibit affirmative action in their respective states.

The first state to do so was

California with its passage of the California Civil Rights Initiative (CCRl). It declared
that “California government agencies may not discriminate or grant preferential treatment
based on race, sex, color, ethnicity and national origin in public employment, education
and contracting’’(Volokh 1997, 2).
The CCRl could be applied only to state agencies, which were forced or
pressured to make a race-based decision. The CCRl stated.
Discrimination in pursuit of a goal or timetable is similarly prohibited,
regardless of whether the goal is rigid or flexible; so long as one applicant
is treated differently from another based on race or sex, that’s
discrimination (Volokh 1997, 4)
By banning preferential treatment, the CCRl set out to limit the scope of how Title Vll
would be applied and send a clear message that race-based decisions would no longer be
tolerated.
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The Supreme Court’s decisions supporting affirmative action gave it the judicial
authority needed. Many employers, government agencies and educational institutions
implemented affirmative action plans following the Supreme Court decisions in Griggs,
Bakke and Webber. However, the Court’s rulings in Croson and Adarand resulted in a
drastic weakening of the policy. Many of the same employers, government agencies and
educational institutions that once established affirmative action plans dismantled them
following the Court’s decisions. The Court’s rulings that limited the scope of affirmative
action also reflected the public opinion with regard to the policy. Voters in Washington
and Texas passed initiatives like the one in California.

Support shifted away from

affirmative action throughout the 1980s and 1990s as the public elected conservative
presidents for three consecutive terms. The Supreme Court followed the public’s lead;
with the help o f appointments from Republican presidents the composition of the Court
changed to one that supported such ideologies.

Public opinion and Supreme Court

decisions against the policy left many questioning its future.
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CHAPTER 3

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN CASES
On June 23, 2003, the United States Supreme Court changed the way in which
affirmative action plans could be implemented in higher education.

The revision

followed two decisions pertaining to the policy at the University of Michigan: Gratz v.
Bollinger,^ 529 U.S — (2003), which addressed the undergraduate admissions policy and
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. — (2003), the Law School. Both plaintiffs alleged that the
affirmative action plans violated the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The Court issued two different opinions - one that
upheld the law school’s affirmative action plan and the other that deemed the
undergraduate plan unconstitutional.

The contrasting opinions were based on a

difference in the implementation of the two affirmative action plans. The undergraduate
program used a point system while the law school applied “soft variables” to its goal of
achieving a “critical mass.” Justice O’Connor provided the swing vote that enabled
affirmative action to remain in higher education only if it mirrored that of the University
of Michigan Law School’s policy.

' When referring to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Gratz and Grutter, I will use page numbers according
to Findlaw because a bound copy of the Court’s opinion is not yet available.
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The Undergraduate Case
In Gratz v. Bollinger (2003) the plaintiffs, Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Harnacher,
applied for admission into the University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science
and Arts (LSA) in 1995 and 1997, respectively. Both white Michigan residents were
denied admission even though met the published standards.

Gratz applied with an

adjusted grade point average (GPA) of 3.8 and an ACT score of twenty-five, and
Hamacher had an adjusted GPA of 3.0 and an ACT score of twenty-eight (Lauriat 2003,
4). The Office of Undergraduate Admissions (QUA), applied an affirmative action plan,
which sought a diverse student body composed of different races, ethnicities, cultures and
socioeconomic backgrounds led to their rejection (Lauriat 2003, 4).

The QUA

considered a number of factors when making its decision to admit a student, including
“high school grades, standardized test scores, high school quality, curriculum strength,
and geography”(529 U.S. — 2003, 5). Besides these factors, the affirmative action plan
also took race into account by targeting “underrepresented minorities” for admission.
The university classified “African-Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans to be
underrepresented minorities” (529 U.S. — 2003, 5). “Undergraduate applicants from
1995-1998 were sorted into cells using grids marked on the vertical axis with GPAs, and
on the horizontal axis with test scores”(Cohen and Sterba 2003, 182).

Under these

guidelines, the university admitted all qualified “minority groups as soon as possible,
without deferring or postponing their applications^” (Gratz Respondent Brief 2003, 7).
This discrepancy led the undergraduate program to revise its affirmative action plan. The
new plan implemented a point system where one could receive a total of 150 points, but
only 100 were needed for acceptance.

One hundred ten points were designated for

Page numbers refer to Respondent Brief in Gratz obtained from Findlaw.com.
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academic factors and the other forty could be given based on other factors (Gratz
Respondent Brief 2003, 7).
Examples of academic factors included eighty points for GPA, twelve for
standardized tests and up to four for strength in high school {Gratz Respondent Brief
2003, 7).

A few of the “other factors” considered were ten points for Michigan

residency, four for alumnus, and twenty for one of the following: (a) socioeconomic
disadvantage; (b) membership in an underrepresented minority group; (c) attendance at a
predominantly minority or predominantly socioeconomically disadvantaged high school;
(d) recruitment for athletics; and (e) provost discretion {Gratz Respondent Brief 2003,
9). Gratz and Hamacher sued the University of Michigan arguing that the designation of
twenty points for the above factors violated the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
In 2000, the first district court Gratz decision examined whether diversity served
a compelling interest.

The required the court to consider if Justice Powell’s Bakke

opinion represented a binding opinion. Powell maintained that a campus could use race
in admissions if the policy sought a diverse campus.

Demonstrating its support for

Powell’s opinion, the district court declared that even though there were not five justices
concluding that diversity served a compelling interest in Bakke, there were five who
believed that race may be considered in the admissions process.
The court proposed that Justice Brennan’s silence as to the diversity issue
is not necessarily a rejection of the idea. In the later Metro Broadcasting
case. Justice Brennan explicitly recognizes Justice Powell’s diversity
argument from 'Bakke (Raines 2002, 11).
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The district court found diversity to serve a compelling interest and applied Bakke
as precedent. The court reiterated its support of a diverse campus by upholding
the University of Michigan affirmative action plan.
The second district court Gratz trial occurred one year later. It considered if the
undergraduate plan was narrowly tailored. This obligation, founded on Supreme Court
precedent, mandates that all racial considerations be strictly scrutinized. The first
component of strict scrutiny was met when the district court ruled that the university had
a compelling interest in a diverse campus. The second aspect addressed in this case,
pertained to the structure of the plan to ensure that it was precisely tailored to serve that
interest.

The district court determined that the original grid method used by the

university was unconstitutional because it automatically accepted all minority applicants.
However, it concluded that the revised point system met the standard because the twenty
points could be distributed for more than simply race. The district court also noted that
applicants could be “flagged” if they possessed certain qualities or characteristics (Swink
2003, 14). Taking all this into account, the court upheld Michigan’s affirmative action
plan, but this time on the grounds that it achieved a diverse campus by applying a
narrowly tailored method.
The plaintiffs appealed the district court rulings to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit where the judges heard Gratz and Grutter at the same time. The Sixth
Circuit issued a ruling in Grutter, but it failed to do so in Gratz. Without a circuit court
decision, Gratz and Hamacher petitioned the United States Supreme Court to hear their
case. The Court agreed and it was argued on April 1, 2003, and a decision was issued on
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June 23, 2003.

In a 6-3, ruling the Court reversed the two previous district court

decisions that had upheld the undergraduate policy.
The six members of the majority included Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, Antonin
Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, David Breyer and Clarence Thomas. Rehnquist delivered the
opinion of the Court and began by considering Stevens’s claim that Hamacher did not
have standing to sue because (1) he never attempted to apply as a transfer student; and
(2) if he had done so it would not be applicable since Gratz involved the freshman
undergraduate admissions policy, not the transfer (529 U.S. — 2003, 8). On the first
point, Rehnquist disagreed with Stevens arguing that:
After being denied admission, Hamacher demonstrated that he is able and
ready to apply, as a transfer student should the University cease to use race
in undergraduate admissions.
He therefore has standing to seek
prospective relief with respect to the University’s continued use of race in
undergraduate admissions (529 U.S. — 2003, 9).
Rehnquist determined that Hamacher had been denied equal consideration as a freshman
because the point system gave “underrepresented minorities” an unequal advantage in the
admissions process. Hamacher’s initial rejection and subsequent assertion that he would
transfer if race were no longer weighted provided him standing.

Rehnquist addressed

Stevens’s second argument against standing by contending that:
In the present case, the University’s use of race in undergraduate transfer
admission does not implicate a significantly different set of concerns than
does its use of race in undergraduate freshman admissions. Respondents’
failure to allege any such differences is simply consistent with the fact that
no such difference exists (529 U.S. — 2003, 10).
For Rehnquist, the freshman undergraduate policy and transfer policy were one in the
same because the respondents did not highlight the differences between the two.
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Rehnquist then turned to the question of whether the University of Michigan plan
could be viewed as being narrowly tailored.

He concluded that the policy, “which

automatically distributed twenty points or one fifth of those needed to guarantee
admission, to every single underrepresented minority applicant solely because of race, is
not narrowly tailored to achieve the interest of diversity” (529 U.S. — 2003, 12). The
Chief Justice referred to Powell’s opinion in Bakke, which focused on an individualized
consideration of each applicant. The automatic designation of points did not reflect an
individualized or case specific approach and, because of this, it violated the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause.
Justice O’Connor, concurring with the majority opinion criticized the fixed
distribution of points for “underrepresented minorities” because it overlooked other
important qualities. She noted “that an outstanding leader could not receive more than
five points for her accomplishments, which is only one fourth of the points assigned to
someone underrepresented”(529 U.S. — 2003, 6).

O’Connor suggested that the

university revise its affirmative action policy, which she labeled as “non individualized”
and “mechanical.”
Thomas also concurred with the majority stating, “The LSA policy fails, however,
because it does not sufficiently allow for the consideration of non-racial distinctions
among underrepresented minority applicants” (529 U.S. — 2003, 7).

Justice Breyer

concurred with the majority, yet did not join the Court in its opinion. Instead, he joined
O’Connor’s opinion “except insofar as it joined that of the Court” (529 U.S. — 2003, 7.).
He cited his agreement with Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, which emphasized a societal
obligation to true racial and ethnic equality.
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Justice Souter joined Stevens’s dissent over the issue of standing. Stevens argued
that Hamacher did not have standing to sue and thus the Court should not consider the
case. He noted that both petitioners were enrolled at other institutions when the lawsuit
was filed. Moreover, neither one had attempted to transfer to the University of Michigan
following initial rejection. Stevens wrote, “To seek forward-looking, injunctive relief,
petitioners must show that they can face an imminent threat of future injury” (529 U.S. —
- 2003, 19). Hamacher contended he would have reapplied had the University removed
its consideration of race. Stevens argued that because Hamacher had not attempted to
transfer, he did not suffer a potential legal injury. Stevens also challenged the majority’s
conclusion that the transfer and the freshman process were the same. He mentioned that
the transfer policy was not included in the documents provided to the Court. Without this
information, the majority determined that the policies were one in the same, which he
believed was not the case. Gratz and Hamacher argued that the freshman policy that used
a point system was unconstitutional. However, Hamacher’s claim of harm as a potential
transfer student did not make sense because the transfer policy did not utilize a point
system. Stevens concluded this discrepancy as one that failed to provide Hamacher with
standing since the point system was the policy at issue.
Stevens also recognized that as a member of a class action suit, Hamacher still
must show actual harm caused by the undergraduate affirmative action plan.

He

suggested that other members may have been harmed by the undergraduate policy, but
Hamacher did not demonstrate harm. Without a personal stake, Hamacher did not have
standing in Gratz and precedent left no alternative but to dismiss the case for lack of
standing.
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Justice Ginsburg joined Souter in a separate dissent to the majority ruling. Souter
observed that non-minority applicants have the same chance at gaining the twenty points
under the freshman policy because other factors such as athletic ability and
socioeconomic disadvantage are included.

By assigning a value to a variety of

characteristics, the University of Michigan employed a narrowly-tailored plan that
considered all applicants individually. Souter criticized the United States government
brief that expressed support of percentage plans rather than a point system designed to
achieve a diverse campus. Souter noted that:
The percentage plans are just as race conscious as the point scheme (and
fairly so), but they get their racially diverse results without saying directly
what they are doing or why they are doing it. In contrast, Michigan states
its purpose directly and, if this were a doubtful case for me, I would be
tempted to give Michigan an extra point of its own for its frankness, equal
protection cannot become an exercise in which the winners are the ones
who hide the ball (529 U.S. — 2003, 25).
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent discussed the current disparity among racial and ethnic
lines as the fundamental justification for affirmative action.

Statistics citing the

differences in income, education and employment represent obstructions to a truly equal
society. She wrote.
Bias both conscious and unconscious, reflecting traditional and
unexamined habits of thought, keeps up barriers that must come down if
equal opportunity and nondiscrimination are ever genuinely to become
this country’s law and practice (529 U.S. — 2003, 26).
Instead, Ginsburg preferred an open and up-front policy of affirmative action, like the
one published by the university that explained the twenty point designation.

She

expressed concern that the only alternative to an open policy such as Michigan’s would
be a hidden one. She referred to other universities that required students to write an essay
on their cultural background as a form of hidden affirmative action. Ginsburg maintained
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that the obligation to fix inequalities experienced by minorities should not be overlooked
and affirmative action should be in place to address this issue.
Even though it was a close decision, the outcome of Gratz forced many colleges
and universities to revise their affirmative action plans. Rehnquist’s majority opinion
condemned the automatic twenty point designation for “underrepresented minorities.”
This rejection of the point system led the Court to find that such policies are not narrowly
tailored; hence, they are unconstitutional.

Conversely, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent

suggested “that decision makers in a system of sponsored mobility should use numbers as
a source of accountability to individuals, underrepresented groups and the public mission
of the institution’’(Guiner 2003, 23). Regardless of the variance in opinion, the Gratz
decision proscribed the legal use of affirmative action via point-assignment.

The Law School Case
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. — (2003), heard in conjunction with Gratz,
involved a suit against the University of Michigan Law School affirmative action policy.
Barbara Grutter, a white Michigan resident, applied for admission into the program in
1996. At first, she was placed on the waiting list, but in June 1997 she was denied
admission (Swink 2003, 15). Grutter met the published standards by obtaining a 3.8
GPA and 161 LSAT score. In response to her rejection, she filed a suit alleging that the
law school’s consideration of race as the “predominant factor” in the admissions process,
made it a violation of the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
(Swink 2003, 15).
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Since 1992, the law school followed an admissions policy adhering closely to the
Supreme Court recommendations in Bakke. Rather than using set-asides or quotas, the
Bakke opinion supported the use of a flexible affirmative action plan that took into
account various aspects of each applicant. Items such as undergraduate GPAs and essays
inquiring how one would contribute to a diverse campus were all considered in the law
school admissions process. In addition to academic qualities, the institution recognized
“soft variables” for each applicant such as travel abroad and family hardships.

The

combination of academic qualities and “soft variables” helped admissions officials
determine whom to accept.

Nevertheless, the school openly advocated its use of

affirmative action in order to achieve a diverse campus. The policy stated that “The law
school seeks to admit students who show substantial promise for success in law school, in
the practice of law, and who are likely to contribute in diverse ways to the well being of
others”(Fata and Schumaker 2003, 2). The program defined diversity broadly, “it seeks a
mix of students with varying backgrounds and experiences that will respect and learn
from each other” (Fata and Schumaker 2003, 2).
To promote diversity, the law school sought to achieve a “critical mass” of
underrepresented students. Law school admissions officials explained a “critical mass”
as “meaningful representation that is understood to mean a number that encourages
underrepresented minority students to participate in the classroom and not feel
isolated^”(Brief for the Respondents 2003, 6). The definition of “critical mass”
represented a major part of the debate in Grutter. The law school defended its use of a
“critical mass.”

^ Page numbers refer to Respondent Brief in Grutter obtained from Findlaw.com.

42

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Professing an abhorrence of all target numbers and race quotas, the law
school insisted that it sought no more than a critical mass of minority
students. A critical mass is regularly found when the number of minority
admissions reached ten to twelve percent (Sterba and Cohen 2003, 83).
While the law school maintained the range of percentages accepted under the “critical
mass” as flexible and not constituting a quota, Grutter argued the contrary claiming that
the range o f percentages did indeed constitute a quota. Statisticians who testified noted,
...when cell by cell, and year by year, underrepresented minority
applicants are admitted in significantly greater proportions than their non
minority competitors with similar UGPA and LSAT scores, it is clear that
this accords the race of applicants a great deal of weight (Swink 2003,16).
At issue in district court was whether racial diversity served a compelling state
interest and, if so was the law school plan narrowly tailored? The court first determined
that Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke was his and his alone, which meant the court was
not obligated to follow his opinion. “The Brennan group does not so much as mention
the diversity rationale in their opinion, and they specifically declined to join in the
portion of Justice Powell’s opinion that addressed that issue” (Swink 2003, 16). This
position led the district court to conclude that according to Supreme Court precedent,
diversity did not serve a compelling interest. Furthermore, it found that a “critical mass”
was not a narrowly tailored policy because:
(1) No one at the Law School could define a “critical mass;” (2) there is
no time limit on the use of affirmative action; (3) underrepresented
minorities received special attention in the admission process; [and]
(4) the school does not consider other methods of increasing minority
enrollment (Swink 2003, 16).
These factors provided the district court with several reasons why it deemed the plan
unconstitutional.
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The district court decision in Grutter was eventually appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and on May 14*, 2002, its decision was reversed.
The Sixth Circuit opined that Justice Brennan’s first footnote gave
qualified approval of a race-conscious admissions policy: “We also agree
with Mr. Justice Powell that a plan like the Harvard plan is constitutional
under our approach, at least so long as the use of race to achieve an
integrated student body is necessitated by the lingering effects of past
discrimination” (Swink 2003, 16).
The Sixth Circuit treated Powell’s opinion as binding precedent, finding diversity served
a compelling state interest. This left the question of whether the law school’s plan was
narrowly tailored to establish diversity. Here, it also overturned the district court by
concluding that the law school policy met the narrowly tailored requirement. The circuit
court determined that the plan was narrowly tailored because it considered a variety of
factors for each applicant. The circuit court refuted every one of the reasons the district
court listed as the school’s failure to narrowly tailor its plan. For example, it noted that
the district court’s conclusion that “critical mass” was not defined “[is] at odds with its
characterization of it as the functional equivalent to a quota” (Swink 2003, 17). While it
agreed with the district court that a time limit for affirmative action might be needed, it
left such a decision to the institution (Swink 2003, 17). It also gave deference to the
institution’s ability to choose an appropriate affirmative action plan and establish the
definition of whom it must target for a diverse campus (Swink 2003, 17). The Sixth
Circuit reversed the district court ruling by supporting the compelling need for diversity
and its attainment though a narrowly tailored plan such as the law school’s.
Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) was appealed to the United States Supreme Court and
decided on June 23, 2003. Justice O’Connor provided the swing vote in Grutter by
affirming the circuit court’s decision.

In a 5-4 opinion. Justices O’Connor, Stevens,
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Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer formed the majority while Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy and
Thomas dissented.

O’Connor writing for the majority, “gave great deference to the

University of Michigan Law School’s contention that diversity is essential to its
educational mission” (Lauriat 2003, 4). She conceded that diversity promotes learning
outcomes, and better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society,
and better prepares them as professionals”(Bell 2003, 12). A m id curiae briefs, supporting
the benefits of a diverse workforce were submitted by sixty-five different businesses
including Boeing, Pepsi and Xerox.

The businesses defended the use of affirmative

action because:
The students of today are this country’s corporate and community leaders
o f the next half century. For these students to realize their potential as
leaders, it is essential that they be educated in an environment where they
are exposed to diverse people, ideas, perspectives and interactions'^
{Amicus curiae for 65 Leading American Businesses 2003, 4).
Former military officers and leaders also expressed support for affirmative action: “The
military has made substantial progress towards its goal of a fully integrated, highly
qualified officer corps. It cannot maintain the diversity it has achieved or make further
progress unless it retains its ability to recruit and educate a diverse officer corps”(X/m'cM5
curiae for Lt. General 2003, 5). The briefs written by businesses and military leaders
highlight the advantages of diversity beyond the classroom. They espoused the notion
that a diverse experience in higher education will help prepare students for entry into a
similar situation following graduation. Justice O’Connor acknowledged that:
Just as growing up in a particular region or having particular professional
experiences is likely to affect an individual’s views, so too is one’s own.

Page numbers refer to A m id briefs in Grutter obtained from Findlaw.com. There were sixty-nine am id
curiae briefs in support of the Law School in Grutter and forty-nine in support of the Undergraduate
School in Gratz.
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unique experience of being a racial minority in a society like our own, in
which race unfortunately still matters (539 U.S. — (2003), 16).
By accepting the importance of diversity, O’Connor embraced Powell’s opinion that a
diverse campus serves a compelling interest because it reflects the differences found
within society.

After graduation, students will enter a diverse workforce making a

diverse campus critical so that students learn how to interact with a variety of people.
O’Connor continued by considering whether the law school policy was narrowly
tailored for the advancement of a diverse campus. She reasoned that the use of a “critical
mass’’ allowed it to be narrowly tailored because it did not set specific goals for
admission. This idea was reinforced in the school’s evaluation of each applicant based
on factors such as GPA, LSAT scores, and letters of recommendation. In addition, it
considered “soft variables’’ such as travel abroad, fluency in different languages, and
whether one had to overcome personal adversity or family hardships (539 U.S. — (2003),
16).

These “soft variables’’ looked at qualities besides race, which established an

individualized and flexible approach in the admissions process. O’Connor stated:
The Law School affords this individualized consideration to applicants of
all races. Unlike the program at issue in Gratz, the Law School awards no
predetermined diversity “bonuses’’ based on race or ethnicity (539 U.S. —
(2003), 15).
By using the term “critical mass’’ and not obligating the acceptance of a specific number
of “underrepresented minorities,’’ the policy was constitutional.

Moreover, “soft

variables’’ did not look solely at the race or ethnicity of applicants, rather they enabled
other traits and qualities to be included in the admissions process. This aspect of the
policy ensured a truly diverse campus because it helped students from a variety of
different backgrounds, skin colors, religions, and geographic areas gain admission.
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Despite her support of affirmative action, O’Connor indicated the need for a time limit on
race-conscious admissions policies. Even though she suggested a possible twenty-five
year time limit on affirmative action, O ’Connor’s majority opinion in Grutter upheld
diversity as a compelling state interest and labeled the law school plan a constitutional
model for universities nationwide.
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Breyer joined in a concurring opinion, also
addressed the notion of placing a time frame on the implementation of race-conscious
admission policies. Ginsburg wrote, “From today’s vantage point, one may hope, but not
firmly forecast, that over the next generation’s span, progress toward nondiscrimination
and genuinely equal opportunity will make it safe to sunset affirmative action” (539 U.S.
— (2003), 20). Nevertheless, Ginsburg’s concurring opinion explained her divergence
from O’Connor’s twenty-five year limit; for her, affirmative action must remain in place
as long as disparities exist along racial and ethnic lines.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, author of the dissenting opinion, maintained that the law
school plan did not meet the standards mandated by strict scrutiny.

“Stripped of its

critical mass veil, the law school’s program is revealed as a naked effort to achieve racial
balancing” (539 U.S. — (2003), 20).

Rehnquist referred to admission statistics that

showed underrepresented minorities were selected for admission more so than non
minorities with similar qualifications. For example.
In 2000, 12 Hispanics who scored between 159-160 on the LSAT and
earned a GPA of 3.0 applied for admission and only 2 were admitted.
Meanwhile, 12 African-Americans in the same range of qualifications
applied for admission and all 12 were admitted (539 U.S. — (2003), 22).
Rehnquist challenged the plan because, as the data suggested, certain minorities were
being selected over other minorities. He asked why the law school never explained the
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reason more individuals from specific underrepresented minority groups were needed in
order to achieve a “critical mass” or further diversity? Rehnquist concluded that the goal
of attaining a “critical mass” was simply a cover that provided the law school an
opportunity to ensure that specific underrepresented minorities were accepted (539 U.S. —(2003), 22). He also noted that the lack of a time limit inhibited the admissions policy
from meeting the standard of strict scrutiny. For Rehnquist, the majority incorrectly
found that the law school plan met the standards prescribed in previous precedents
regarding strict scrutiny.
Justice Kennedy, in his dissenting opinion, agreed with the Chief Justice’s
assessment that the policy failed to meet strict scrutiny standards. He too pointed to
statistics that reinforced this argument.
About 80-85 percent of the places in the entering class are given to
applicants in the upper range of the Law School Admission test scores and
grades. An applicant with these credentials likely will be admitted without
consideration of race or ethnicity. With respect to the remaining 15-20
percent of the seats, race is likely outcome determinative for many
members of minority groups (539 U.S. — (2003), 31).
The law school did not demonstrate the manner in which it reviewed each applicant
individually especially when the seats become most competitive. Kennedy referred to the
testimony of admission officers who disclosed they examined incoming admission
statistics daily as a reference point. “The consultation of daily reports during the last
stages in the admissions process suggests there is no further attempt at an individual
review safe for race itself’ (539 U.S. — (2003), 33). This led Kennedy to assert that the
law school plan was unconstitutional because it did not provide an individual assessment
at every stage of the admissions process.
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Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion denounced the split decision by the Court in
Gratz and Grutter. He fulminated that it would spawn never-ending litigation because
the Court did not produce a single solid opinion on the matter of affirmative action. For
him, the majority erroneously supported the law school plan because “The Constitution
proscribes government discrimination on the basis of race, and state-provided education
is no exception” (539 U.S. — (2003), 36).
Justice Thomas’s dissent was more critical towards the majority decision. Besides
the law school’s inability to meet the standards of strict scrutiny, Thomas flatly rejected
the notion of diversity serving a benefit to anyone within society. As he put it “Diversity
is merely a faddish slogan of cognoscenti that depends on deference to the judgment of
know-it-all elites” (539 U.S. — (2003), 20). Thomas contended that O’Connor’s claim
for the benefits of diversity lacked evidence.

“The am id briefs from all comers of

society do not prove that the ‘beneficiaries’ of this racial discrimination perform at (or
even near) the same level as those who receive no preferences” (539 U.S. — (2003), 57).
Merit was important to Thomas and high test scores deserve reward - not diversity.
Diversity has no value to Thomas because it degrades those classified as the
“underrepresented minority.” He thought that the law school plan was unconstitutional
because he did not support the concept of diversity as serving a compelling state interest.
In Grutter v. Bollinger, (2003) the Supreme Court narrowly upheld affirmative
action in higher education.

O’Connor’s majority opinion focused on the compelling

interest in diversity because of the benefits to the future workforce. She supported the
law school plan because of its individualized approach that included “soft variables” and
the ambiguous goal of a “critical mass.” In contrast. Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded
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that the intention of a “critical mass” represented a latent method of ensuring that
“underrepresented minorities” gain admission. Thomas took the stance that diversity was
belittling to minorities because it assumed they could not gamer acceptance into law
school on their own merit. For him, all racial consideration should be avoided, following
Justice Harlan’s concept of a colorblind constitution.
In summary, Gratz and Grutter were two key cases for affirmative action in
higher education.

While Gratz proscribed the use of affirmative action plans that

designated points for specific factors in order to target minority students, Grutter upheld
a policy that looked at numerous qualities of all applicants regardless of race. Many
changes have occurred regarding the manner in which affirmative action has been
implemented. At first, the policy was composed of set-asides and quotas to attain a
specific number of minorities.

In Bakke this method was deemed unconstitutional

because race and ethnicity were the sole criterion for admission into U.C. Davis. Over
thirty years later, in the two University of Michigan cases, the Supreme Court finally
provided an example of how affirmative action plans should be implemented.

The

Court’s support of the law school policy that considered various factors beyond race and
ethnicity provided a new approach to affirmative action. Terms such as “soft variables”
and “critical mass” now represent the constitutional method of implementing an
affirmative action plan. This new approach, narrowly agreed to by the Supreme Court,
has enabled the policy to remain in higher education for the time being. However, it is
difficult to predict how or if affirmative action will be applied in the future. In Grutter,
Justice O’Connor suggested a twenty-five year time limit on the policy. The composition
of the Court due to retirement will surely affect the policy. If conservative appointments
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are made it is likely affirmative action will be reconsidered and found unconstitutional.
Increasing this possibility is the continued controversy surrounding affirmative action
nearly one year after Grutter.

Court appointments and societal opposition may also

encourage the Court to reconsider its decision upholding affirmative action in higher
education.

These factors make the attainment of the twenty-five year time limit on

affirmative action seem like a very slim possibility.
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CHAPTER 4

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE QUESTION OF JUSTICE
In general, executive orders and Supreme Court decisions on affirmative action
involve the policy’s ability to provide equality. For the most part in society, justice and
equality go hand in hand.

For example, Allan Bakke claimed that the U.C. Davis

admission policy based on race was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause. The litigious nature of affirmative action centers on the question of
whether it is just to treat people unequally in order to address an inequality. Opponents
of affirmative action argue that it is unjust because it is a form of reverse discrimination.
They contend that instead of race, gender or ethnic background the main consideration
should be the most qualified candidate, which usually focuses on high test scores. On the
other hand, proponents of affirmative action believe it is just because it helps provide an
opportunity to those who may not have one otherwise, as a result of the history and
consequences of racism and sexism.
It seems that the question of justice is a deciding factor for those formulating an
opinion towards affirmative action. Justice is an important notion and one that many
believe should never be compromised. By reviewing John Rawls’s A Theory o f Justice, it
is possible to show how affirmative action plans that are generally applied to all
minorities can be considered just by applying his hypothetical criterion, “justice as
fairness.” According to Rawls, a just society is one that is based on two principles
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adopted in what he calls the “original position.” By detailing his second principle of
justice referred to as the “difference principle,” an argument for affirmative action can
be made. To evaluate Rawls’s theory, Ronald Dworkin’s critique of A Theory o f Justice
will be used.

Dworkin posits that the hypothetical nature of the “original position”

cannot make it a binding agreement for principles of justice. He also claims that the
“difference principle” does not provide for a just society in all instances.

Although

Dworkin rejects the “original position” and the “difference principle,” his arguments
concerning justice also provide an alternative viewpoint in support of affirmative action.

An Overview of Rawls’s Theory
In A Theory o f Justice, John Rawls maintains that individuals free of their
knowledge of advantages and disadvantages will make fair and equal principles of
justice. He applies a contractarian view of justice in which “free, equal and rational”
members of a society accept his hypothetical contract from the “original position.” By
adopting the “original position,” citizens are agreeing to what Rawls calls “justice as
fairness.” This consists of: (1) an interpretation of the initial situation and of the problem
of choice posed there, and (2) a set of principles, which it is argued, would be agreed to
(Sterba 1999, 14).
The first component of “justice as fairness” is a well-ordered society. According
to Rawls, it is a society in which (1) everyone accepts and knows that the others accept
the same principles of justice, and (2) the basic institutions generally satisfy and are
generally known to satisfy these principles (Rawls 1999, 4). Hence, Rawls’s well-ordered
society depends upon all members understanding the principles of justice they adopt and
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the institutions they create help ensure the principles of justice are maintained. “Justice
as fairness” involves social justice, thus it is mostly concerned with how institutions
distribute fundamental rights and duties, and how they determine the division of
advantages from social cooperation (Rawls 1999, 6). Consequently, for the most part, the
focus of this chapter will be on how Rawls provides a situation in which institutions
actively preserve the principles of justice.
In “justice as fairness”, “the original position of equality corresponds to the state
of nature in the traditional theory of social contract” (Rawls 1999, II). According to
Rawls, the “original position” follows the basic structure of the contractarian view
towards justice. Although the “original position” is a hypothetical situation, it serves as
an important part of his theory toward the creation of a just society.^ The hypothetical
situation allows Rawls to consider what principles of justice would be adopted, in order
to establish a just society, if all citizens were equal and did not know their own
advantages or disadvantages in advance. This is critical to Rawls’s theory because it
provides him the opportunity to create a “what i f ’ situation where justice is the central
objective.
The features of the “original position” are that “no one knows his place in society,
his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of
natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, age, gender and the like” (Rawls
1999, 11). This allows members of a society to accept principles of justice under what
Rawls calls a “veil of ignorance.” The “veil of ignorance” helps ensure that “no one is
advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance

^ Tom Campbell argues that the original position fails to take into account an individuaTs desire to be a
member of a culture or community (Campbell 2001, 112).
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or the contingency of social circumstance because no one knows where she will be in the
resulting society” (Rawls 1999, 12). The “veil of ignorance” creates a situation where
members of society do not adopt principles of justice that increase their advantages but
instead, choose principles that will be fair and equal to everyone in society. In fact, the
fair and equitable situation that the “veil of ignorance” creates is why Rawls calls his
theory “justice as fairness”. Given this “original position,” the two principles, which
members then adopt under the “veil of ignorance”, are:
(I) each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for
others; [and] (2) social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so
that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage,
and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all (Rawls 1999, 53).
Liberties such as the right to vote and freedom of speech are equally protected to all
under the first principle. While the second principle involves the distribution of income
and wealth under it, both do not need to be equal but must be distributed to everyone’s
advantage, unless an unequal distribution is to everyone’s advantage. Thus, if financial
inequalities exist they must be addressed in favor of those who are worse off, unless it is
to the advantage of everyone to maintain the inequality.

The second principle also

requires positions of authority and responsibility to be accessible to all members of
society. Rawls ranks the principles in importance. The first is the most important and the
second is consequent and inferior to the first. “This ranking means that infringements of
the basic equal liberties protected by the first principle cannot be justified or compensated
for, by greater social and economic advantages” (Rawls 1999, 54). Other kinds of
liberties that are not addressed specifically by the first principle, such as the freedom to
contract, are not basic, and thus will not be protected under the first principle.
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Based on the ranking of the preceding two principles, Rawls’s general conception
of justice is that “all social values - liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the
social bases of self-respect - are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution
of any, or all of these values is to everyone’s advantage” (Rawls 1999, 54). Therefore,
within “justice as fairness,” this “difference principle” ensures that social and economic
inequalities are arranged so that both benefit the least advantaged. In addition, under the
two principles of justice, there are no restrictions on what inequalities are allowed as long
as inequalities improve everyone’s position within society. Rawls explicitly notes that
inequalities such as slavery would not be allowed because it would not help everyone’s
situation if it were permitted.
The Difference Principle
To help define the phrases “everyone’s advantage” and “equally open to all,”
Rawls uses institutions within society. Moreover, he applies the concept of democratic
equality to institutions.

This concept combines the principle of fair equality of

opportunity with the “difference principle.” “The intuitive idea is that the social order is
not to establish and secure the more attractive prospects of those better off unless doing
so is to the advantage of those less fortunate” (Rawls 1999, 65). Thus Rawls’s second
principle of justice relies mostly on the “difference principle.” In the example of an
entrepreneurial class on owning property, Rawls explains the “difference principle.” He
begins by assuming that members of the entrepreneurial class are more likely to be better
off than unskilled laborers. According to the “difference principle,” inequality is justified
only if lowering the expectation of advantages for the least advantaged would make them
less badly off. Rawls’s example of the “difference principle” illustrates his belief that if
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unskilled workers would be made even more disadvantaged by lowering the expectation
of advantages, then it should not be lowered.
Rawls argues that two important considerations of the “difference principle”
should take place within “justice as fairness.” “First, if the expectations of the least
advantaged are already maximized, no changes in the expectations of those who are
better off can help those who are worse o ff’ (Rawls 1999, 68). The second consideration
addresses the issue that, within the “difference principle,” inequalities are chainconnected meaning that if the expectations of the least advantaged are raised, all of the
positions will experience an increase. However, the chain connection fails to identify the
problem that occurs when the least advantaged do not experience an increase. Rawls is
illustrating that the “difference principle” appears to react only from the bottom up and
fails to increase advantages from the top down. He continues to defend the use of the
“difference principle” because of its capability to spread benefits among all members of
society. According to Rawls, “it seems probable that if the authority and power of
legislators and judges say, improve the situation of the less favored, they improve that of
citizens generally” (Rawls 1999, 71). He also claims that the lexical nature of the
“difference principle,” in which the welfare of the least advantaged is the first to be
maximized, also helps reduce the chain reaction dilemma. By applying the “difference
principle” to the second principle of justice Rawls revises it to state:
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both
(a) to the greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached
to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity (Rawls 1999, 72).
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Applying the Difference Principle to Institutions
In “justice as fairness” members adopt principles that provide for a fair and just
society. Rawls maintains that within his theory of “justice as fairness,” justice is a pure
procedural matter. This means that justice is “a correct or fair procedure such that the
outcome is likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that the procedure has been
properly followed” (Rawls 1999, 75). Individuals use “reflective equilibrium” to
determine the moral standards and reasons why the institution is obligated to follow
them. Procedural justice holds society accountable for making the rules that institutions
follow to ensure justice.
Within “justice as fairness” social position also plays a key role. Rawls notes that
the subject of justice revolves around the structure of society. This is critical because an
individual's status within society determines the role she plays. He begins by assuming
everyone has equal citizenship and that their places within society are defined by
distributions of income and wealth.

In turn, equal citizenship is defined by how

successful institutions are at creating a situation where everyone will benefit. However,
establishing a system to judge social and economic inequalities is much more difficult.
Rawls leaves this imperative step up to the political authority or those with more
responsibility within associations. To define the least advantaged Rawls describes:
.. .this group as including persons whose family and class origins are more
disadvantaged than others, whose natural endowments (as realized) permit
them to fare less well, and whose fortune and luck in the course of life turn
out to be less happy, all within the normal ranges and with the relevant
measures based on social primary goods (Rawls 1999, 83).
Moreover, Rawls addresses the arbitrary way by which the least advantaged are defined.
He posits that one method of identifying the least advantaged could be through a social
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position, but mentions other ways such as wealth and income. The importance here is to
create a method of identifying the least advantaged. Once this is done, the “difference
principle” can be applied to provide the least advantaged with feelings of self-worth.
Consequently, the least advantaged will be more willing to participate within society,
which is central to Rawls’s notion of justice.
“Justice as fairness” applies mostly to a social system based on equal citizenship
and proportional distribution of wealth. To address inequalities based on gender or race,
Rawls again refers to the “difference principle”. Here, he claims that if an inequality
based on race is to the advantage of the disadvantaged then it is justified. Nonetheless,
Rawls asserts that inequalities such as those based on race usually do not serve to assist
the disadvantaged in “justice as fairness.”
Why Apply The Difference Principle to Institutions?
For Rawls, the most important job institutions perform is providing a situation
where the principles of justice are followed. The main aspect of his two principles of
justice centers on the ability of institutions to redistribute advantages to ensure equality.
The “principle of redress” is one such method of redistributing advantages. “The redress
principle holds that in order to treat all persons equally, to provide genuine equality of
opportunity, society must give more attention to those with fewer native assets and to
those bom into the less favorable social positions” (Rawls 1999, 86). Rawls uses the
example o f directing more educational resources to the least advantaged. By doing so,
the least advantaged gain an opportunity to participate within society, which increases
feelings of self-worth.

The additional resources distributed through the “principle of

redress” are similar to that of the “difference principle.” Thus the principle of redress is
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thought to represent one of the elements in our conception of justice (Rawls 1999, 86).
The “principle of redress” and the “difference principle” would come to the same
conclusion, but in a different manner.

Instead, the “difference principle” would allow

more resources for the less educated if it would improve the overall condition of the
society.
Therefore, we are led to the difference principle if we wish to set up the
social system so that no one gains or loses from this arbitrary place in the
distribution of natural assets or his initial position in society without
giving or receiving compensating advantages in return (Rawls 1999, 87).
Even though the redress and difference principles are not the same, Rawls believes both
have an identical intent.

The difference principle represents, in effect, an agreement

regarding the distribution of natural talents as in some respects a common asset and to
share in the greater social and economic benefits made possible by the complementarities
of this distribution (Rawls 1999, 87). Rawls argues that the “difference principle” has the
same capability as the “principle of redress,” which is to ensure institutions equally
redistribute advantages. However, under the “difference principle,” natural inequalities
are compensated for only when it benefits the common good, whereas under the
“principle of redress” they are compensated regardless of that benefit.
Another way the “difference principle” provides an equal society is through
institutions and their capacity to create a mutual benefit. Rawls acknowledges that some
may argue the “difference principle” does not ensure reciprocity because it serves only
the least advantaged.

Y et, he does not agree w ith the preceding assertion because the

application of the “difference principle” requires:
.. .the more advantaged to recognize that the well being of each depends
on the scheme of social cooperation without which no one could have a
satisfactory life: they recognize also that they can expect the willing
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cooperation of all only if the terms of the scheme are reasonable (Rawls
1999,88).
No one has a prior claim to advantages and, under the “difference principle,” everyone
gains because the most advantaged are compensated by distributing benefits to the least
advantaged. This creates a mutual benefit [reciprocity] to both groups because the most
advantaged gain by helping to provide a just society while the least gain when given
additional benefits. In order to ensure that this occurs it is important that contributions to
the less advantaged remain positive and do not exceed the maximum amount.

If

contributions surpass the maximum amount, reciprocity no longer exists. Rawls explains
the importance of reciprocity by stating, “it is to realize the ideal of the harmony of
interests on terms that nature has given us, and to meet the criterion of mutual benefit,
that we should stay in the region of positive contributions” (Rawls 1999, 90). Through
the proportional distribution of advantages, Rawls establishes a basis by which
distributions should occur to ensure reciprocity.

Everyone cooperates in “justice as

fairness” because they want to maintain the just society that is established through the
two principles of justice.
An additional reason why Rawls defends the use of the “difference principle” is
its inherent principle of fraternity. “Fraternity is held to represent a certain equality of
social esteem manifest in various public conventions and in the absence of manners of
deference and servility” (Rawls 1999, 91). Rawls maintains that feelings of fraternity are
achieved through the “difference principle” because everyone adheres to the concept o f

helping the least advantaged. Rawls believes that fraternity is vital to his theory because
the concept is oftentimes excluded from democratic theory.

Overall, he asserts that the

“difference principle” includes fraternity by creating a society that collectively works to
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help the least advantaged. He even states, “we might conjecture that in the long run, if
there is an upper bound on ability, we would eventually reach a society with the greatest
equal liberty the members of which enjoy the greatest equal talent” (Rawls 1999, 96).
Rawls’s implication is that the continual use of the “difference principle” could lead to a
just society in which everyone has the opportunity to experience his or her greatest talent.
Principles for Individuals
The two principles adopted in “justice as fairness” help establish the structure of
society as it relates to institutions. Principles for individuals must also be chosen in order
to provide for a just society. While Rawls does not go into depth describing the exact
method for establishing principles for individuals, he does maintain that there should be a
sequence or specific numerical ordering for each principle. According to Rawls, one of
the main principles that individuals should adhere to is the “principle of fairness.”
This principle holds that a person is required to do his part as defined by
the rules of the institution when two conditions are met: first, the
institution is just (or fair) if it satisfies the two principles of justice, and
second, one has voluntarily accepted the benefit of the arrangement or
taken advantage of the opportunities it offers to further one’s interests
(Rawls 1999, 98).
The “principle of fairness” does not allow an individual to receive advantages from
others without the individual first completing his or her obligations to society. A second
obligation is formed by the institutions that determine what an individual is required to
do.

Finally, individuals must cooperate in order to ensure that the agreed-upon

arrangement continues.

In addition to obligations under the ‘principle of fairness,” individuals have
natural duties. The following are examples of natural duties: “(1) the duty of helping
another when he is in need or jeopardy, provided that one can do so without excessive

62

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

risk or loss to oneself; (2) the duty not to harm or injure another; and (3) the duty not to
cause unnecessary suffering” (Rawls 1999, 98).

Rawls refers to the first duty as a

positive duty because an individual is performing a good deed for another. The last two
duties are negative because they require an individual to not act in a bad maimer.
Regardless of whether positive or negative, everyone in society must adhere to his/her
natural duties without creating a formal agreement or having an institution establish rules.
“Natural duties apply to everyone in society therefore they obtain between all as equal
moral persons” (Rawls 1999, 98). Here Rawls emphasizes that natural duties
automatically apply to everyone on a moral basis, which is also part of the “original
position.” Nevertheless, Rawls believes that those who are more advantaged may have
more obligations to the “principle of fairness” because of their additional responsibilities.
When discussing natural duties, Rawls mentions supererogatory actions such as heroism,
but these actions do not fall under natural duties. Rawls explains, “For while we have a
natural duty to bring about a great good, say, if we can do so relatively easily, we are
released from this duty when the cost to ourselves is considerable”( Rawls 1999, 100).
Rawls argues that supererogatory actions should not be considered natural duties because
they go above and beyond natural duties. Natural duties, as described by the “principle
of fairness,” ensure all individuals contribute to the creation of an equal society under the
“original position.”
“Justice as fairness” relies on the “original position” as the foundation for Rawls’s
two principles of justice. The “veil of ignorance” ensures principles that are adopted
serve to the advantage of everyone rather than one’s self interest. However, once the veil
is lifted, members of society continue to follow the two principles of justice adopted
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within the “original position.” The first principle involves equality and rights and takes
priority over the second, which focuses on economic advantages. In the second principle,
the “difference principle” is used to help redistribute advantages to those who are less
advantaged.

Distributions that occur, under the “difference principle,” must benefit

society in general and individuals have an obligation, according to the “principle of
fairness,” that both principles of justice are followed.

Rawls and Affirmative Action
The “difference principle” distributes goods on the basis of social and economic
inequalities.

Economic distributions include income and wealth while social goods

pertain to liberty and opportunity, which, according to Rawls, outweigh economic
distributions.

Because social distributions take precedence under the “difference

principle,” one may argue that a policy such as affirmative action could be used to ensure
social inequalities are addressed. For example, the least advantaged group, which are
those whom the “difference principle” is designed to help, could be composed of
minorities and women, both of whom are the normal beneficiaries of affirmative action
(Gray 2001, 145). Although Rawls does not specify the least advantaged group, he does
state that “ ...the difference principle ...requires that the higher expectations of the more
advantaged contribute to the prospects of the least advantaged [or that] social and
economic inequalities must be in the best interests of the representative men in all social
positions” (Rawls 1999, 95-96). For Rawls, economic equality is not the priority, but
redistribution of social goods such as education is essential so that the least advantaged
gain self-respect and equally participate within society.
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Thus, for example, resources for education are not to be allotted solely or
necessarily mainly according to their return as estimated in productive
trained abilities, but also according to their worth in enriching the personal
and social life of citizens, including here [justice is fairness] the less
favored (Rawls 1999, 92).
Accordingly, affirmative action reflects the notion of the “difference principle” when
minority representation [the least advantaged] is deemed important by a university
because o f the opportunity it provides to those who may not have been able to attend
college otherwise. In turn, fraternity is achieved when the least advantaged acquire a
new-found self-respect and knowledge that translates into an ability to participate in
society. These ideas are critical to the defense of affirmative action. Affirmative action
plans that implement different standards for minorities to increase their enrollment
reflects the idea that no one has a prior claim to attend a university. Because of this,
affirmative action can be used to include groups (minorities) that have traditionally been
excluded from the opportunity to attend college. Furthermore, reciprocity ensures that
the advantaged gain under policies such as affirmative action because they help advance
the lives of the least advantaged, which benefits the advantaged because the policy
contributes to the development of a more equal and just society.

Dworkin On Rawls’s A Theory o f Justice
Ronald Dworkin offers an interesting critique of Rawls’s A Theory o f Justice on
several different grounds. He questions the “original position” as a basis for Rawls’s two
principles of justice and discusses the possibility of citizens actually choosing the two
principles without the “veil of ignorance.”

In addition, Dworkin argues that even
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granting Rawls’s conditions, his use of the “difference principle” does not always provide
equality.
One aspect of Rawls’s theory that Dworkin critiques is the basis of the “original
position”. He believes that the “original position” cannot be binding because of its
hypothetical nature. According to Dworkin,
His [Rawls] contract is hypothetical and hypothetical contracts do not
supply an independent argument for the fairness of enforcing their terms.
A hypothetical contract is not simply a pale form of an actual contract; it is
no contract at all (Dworkin 1978, 151).
The contract under “justice as fairness” would be void because those who enter it are not
aware of their standing in society. Rawls’s requirement that people blindly enter the
contract, is the reason Dworkin claims the contract should be null and void. Dworkin
maintains that it is unfair to hold people to a contract for which they may have
miscalculated their self-interest.

One example he uses to show how hypothetical

contracts are unfair involves the purchase of a painting. Dworkin explains that someone
has agreed to purchase a painting on Monday for $100, but on Tuesday it is found to be
extremely valuable. He then asks whether it would be fair to have to sell the painting on
Wednesday for $100 after finding out it is worth more. In this situation, the person
selling the painting gains an advantage over the purchaser when it is found the painting is
worth more. For Dworkin, this illustrates the problem with entering hypothetical
contracts before knowing all the factors involved. Overall, he claims that the “original
position” is invalid because hypothetical contracts arc not legally binding due to the fact

that everyone must have the whole story before agreement.
To further analyze this point, he establishes a difference between an antecedent
interest and an actual interest (Dworkin 1978, 153). An antecedent interest is one where
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an individual will most likely be affected by an action. In contrast, an actual interest
deals with the actual effect the action has on the individual. Dworkin argues that the
“original position” is based on an antecedent interest because the actual situation does not
yet exist due to the veil of ignorance (Dworkin 1978, 153). “It is not in the best interest
of everyone to adopt the two principles, because when the veil of ignorance is lifted,
some will discover they would have been better off if some other principle, like the
principle of average utility, had been chosen” (Dworkin 1978, 153). He criticizes the veil
of ignorance for forcing individuals to adopt, what he believes, are conservative
principles and interprets it as necessary to ensure individuals do not better their position
when principles of justice are being decided upon (Dworkin 1978, 154). Under this
situation, Dworkin notes that the “original position” rightly serves its purpose, but
speculates what would happen if an individual knew his or her place in society.

If

everyone knew his or her place and still chose to accept the same two principles that
Rawls uses, Dworkin would be incorrect. Although if they chose different principles
Dworkin’s antecedent interest argument would invalidate the way principles are adopted.
Dworkin states, “But some actual men, aware of their own talents, might well prefer less
conservative principles that would allow them to take advantage of the resources they
know they have” (Dworkin 1978, 159). He argues that imposing the “veil of ignorance”
requires that individuals choose conservative principles and this directly affects the
antecedent interest of individuals, which makes the contract invalid.
Why Use the Original Position?
Dworkin also inquires as to why Rawls includes the “original position” when he
applies “reflective equilibrium” in his theory of “justice as fairness.”
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“Reflective

equilibrium” is the technique by which Rawls assumes that readers have a sense, which
we draw upon in our daily life, that certain particular political arrangements or decisions,
like conventional trials, are just and others such as slavery are unjust (Dworkin 1978, 55).
According to Rawls, individuals rank the arrangements in order of importance using
“reflective equilibrium.” It also serves as a balance between the first and second principle
of justice. Dworkin uses the example of executing an innocent individual and compares
it to the killing of an innocent bystander in the time of war. He notes that it is generally
accepted that innocent bystanders will be killed during wartime, but it is not accepted to
execute an innocent person.

Dworkin asserts that “reflective equilibrium” allows

individuals to rank the two situations and one ends up being more just than the other.
The concept is composed of two points: “(1) the order of the principles must illustrate
the belief they reflect; and (2) help individuals in situations where beliefs are contradicted
or weak” (Dworkin 1978, 152). “Reflective equilibrium” is important to Rawls because
it applies to individuals in a moral sense. But Dworkin questions why the “original
position” is needed if “reflective equilibrium” plays such a key role on moral issues. He
maintains that “reflective equilibrium” should be enough justification for the adoption of
Rawls’s principles, therefore the “original position” is not necessary. He rejects Rawls’s
argument that “reflective equilibrium” helps reinforce the principles of justice in the
“original position.” Moreover, Dworkin explains that the conditions of the “original
position” are fundamental principles governing our moral powers or, more specifically,
our sense of justice (Dworkin 1978, 158). Because of this, he asserts that the “original
position” is not needed because the notion of justice is a fundamental aspect to all
individuals. Individuals can use their “reflective equilibrium” to help them determine the
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principles of justice without the “original position.” As a result, individuals themselves
could adhere to the principles because of “reflective equilibrium,” without being forced
into the “original position” to construct a concept of justice.
Dworkin On the Difference Principle and His Alternative
Another point of contention for Dworkin is Rawls’s use of the “difference
principle.” Dworkin first mentions that the “difference principle’s’” arbitrary nature
poses a serious problem with regard to the creation of a theory of justice. He examines
the issue because of the “difference principle’s” failure to define the worse off. For
Rawls, the two methods of identifying the least advantaged include: (1) social position
and (2) income and wealth. Dworkin claims that Rawls applies only vague definitions to
the “difference principle,” which plays a critical role in justice as fairness (Dworkin
2000, 113).

Dworkin also points out that the two definitions of the least advantaged

leave out a segment o f society that is physically handicapped.

He suggests that the

“difference principle’s” lack of redress is to blame. Because of the failure to include
redress, he posits that individuals who are physically handicapped can be overlooked
because the least advantaged category acknowledges only social or economic status.
Another problem Dworkin points out with regard to Rawls’s theory, is that the
“difference principle" fails to consider various levels above the least advantaged. He
gives a hypothetical situation to illustrate the limitation o f the “difference principle:”
Suppose an existing economic system is in fact just.

It meets the

conditions o f the difference principle because no further transfers o f

wealth to the worst off class would in fact improve its situation. Then
some impending catastrophe presents officials with a choice. They can act
so the position of the representative member of the small worst off class is
worsened by a just noticeable amount or so that the position of everyone
else is dramatically worsened and they become almost as poor as the worst
off. Does justice really require the much greater loss to everyone but the
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poorest in order to prevent a very small loss by them (Dworkin 2000,
114)?
Dworkin uses this example to illustrate what he considers a major downfall in applying
the “difference principle”. He notes if the preceding situation occurred it would not be
just to provide only the worst-off advantages because it may not benefit society as a
whole. It is problematic to assume that always helping the least advantaged will create a
chain reaction from the bottom up. Dworkin concludes that the “difference principle”
incorrectly ties social class with justice. He contends that his theory, called “equality of
resources,” would correctly apply in the above hypothetical situation because “it aims to
provide a description of (or rather a set of devices for aiming at) equality of resources by
person” (Dworkin 2000, 114). Dworkin does not divide society into two groups based on
social or economic conditions, as does Rawls. Instead, equality is in principle a matter of
individual right rather than one of group position (Dworkin 2000, 114).

Applying

“equality of resources,” a government would be able to determine if it is to the advantage
of everyone to benefit the least advantaged in every circumstance.
Suppose for example, that the tax necessary to provide the right coverage
for handicaps and the unemployed has the long-term effect of
discouraging investment and in this way reducing the primary-goods
prospects of the representative member of the worst-off class. Certain
individual members of the worst-off groups who are handicapped or who
are and will remain unemployed would be better off under the tax scheme
(as would certain members of other classes as well), but the average or
representative member of the worst-off class would be worse-off. The
difference principle, which looks to the worst-off as a whole, would
condemn the tax, but equality of resources would recommend it
nevertheless (Dworkin 2000, 115).

“Equality o f resources” also takes into account individual ambition, talent, and interest
while Rawls fails to do so (Dworkin 2000, 115).

Different people have different

ambitions and goals and Rawls’s failure to recognize this makes it difficult to determine
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those who should be categorized as the least advantaged. “Equality of resources will not
take into account pure luck, including the distribution of natural endowments, but will
allow for the effects of the uses individuals make of their talents and choices they make
in pursuit of their chosen interests in a liberal economy” (Campbell 2001, 82). Moreover,
Dworkin distinguishes between treatment as an equal and equality of treatment. Equality
of treatment pertains to equal distributions for everyone within society.

In contrast,

treatment as an equal is a right all individuals possess. For him, “treatment as an equal
provides everyone the right to equal consideration and respect” (Campbell 2001, 82).
“Equality o f resources” provides everyone the right to treatment as an equal because it
takes into account the differences among individuals.

By taking such factors into

consideration, Dworkin further emphasizes the importance of permitting differences
among those within society.^
Dworkin's assessment of Rawls’s A Theory o f Justice provides some interesting
points. He focuses on the “original position” and reasons why it is not a binding contract.
Dworkin notes that the hypothetical nature of the “original position” makes it a contract
to which individuals are not bound.

He maintains that the “veil of ignorance” also

compromises the authority of the “original position” because individuals may not agree to
the principles once the veil is lifted. Dworkin even suggests that the antecedent interest
compromises the “veil of ignorance” because individuals should know all the facts before
entering an agreement.

He also argues that the “original position” should not exist

because “reflective equilibrium” provides a moral basis by which individuals can create
principles of justice.

Finally, Dworkin attacks the “difference principle” as being a

® Tom Campbell notes a problem with applying “equality of resources” is that it may create a
discriminatory society because it does not make adjustments for resources that are “scarce or in high
demand”(Campbell 2001, 89).
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principle that fails to provide for a just society. He asserts that it lacks the principle of
redress and divides society into two groups based on social and economic status, which
fails to provide for a truly just society in all instances.

Dworkin and Affirmative Action
Would Dworkin support the use of affirmative action in higher education? Since
Grutter, affirmative action plans have been deemed constitutional if based on a flexible
nature. Within his theory “equality of resources” differences in talent and ambition are
acknowledged in society. Meanwhile, the goal is to benefit society overall instead of
focusing only on the betterment of the least advantaged as Rawls does. Dworkin explains
his support of affirmative action:
Nevertheless, colleges, universities, and professional schools use racesensitive standards not in response to any central government mandate but
through individual decisions by individual schools. They act, not to fix
how many members of which races will occupy what roles in the overall
economy and polity, which is in any case beyond their power, but only to
increase the number of blacks and other minorities who are in the pool
fi-om which other citizens - employers, partners, patients, clients, voters
and colleagues acting in their own interests and for their own purposes will choose employees, doctors, lawyers, and public officials in a normal
way (Dworkin 2000, 425).
For Dworkin, affirmative action benefits society as a whole because it increases the
number of minorities in skilled positions. He claims that the decision to enact affirmative
action should come from the university and, once implemented, applicants should be
considered based on their individual attributes.

U sing a “forward—looking” defense,

Dworkin supports affirmative action because of the future affect it will have on the entire
society. Minorities would benefit from an increase in skill level and society benefits
because it will have a larger group of skilled minorities to choose from.

72

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

In conclusion, both Rawls and Dworkin would determine that affirmative action is
just, but in their own unique ways. Rawls contends that education is a social good and
the redistribution to the least advantaged is critical for improvement of society overall.
Self-respect and the opportunity to participate are keys to Rawls’s notion of justice and
support of affirmative action. Through the “difference principle,” affirmative action can
be used because of its focus on improving the lives of the least advantaged. For Rawls,
affirmative action is just because it serves the benefit of the least advantaged (minorities).
On the other hand, Dworkin supports affirmative action because of its future benefits to
society.

Rather than defending affirmative action simply because it benefits the least

advantaged, Dworkin argues that the whole society benefits from the policy. According
to Dworkin, the focus should be on the benefit of society as a whole and affirmative
action does that by increasing the number of minorities in skilled positions. However, the
one concept that both Rawls and Dworkin do agree upon regarding affirmative action is
that it should be applied to all minorities because of its benefit to society as a whole.
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CHAPTER 5

AN EQUITABLE FORM OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: BOOK V OF ARISTOTLE’S
NICOMA CHEA N ETHICS
In order to establish an association between affirmative action and justice one
must first consider some theory of justice. In Chapter 4 we considered the theories of
Rawls and Dworkin.

Book V of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics^ discusses many

important elements of justice that can be utilized to defend affirmative action. He begins
by distinguishing between just and unjust actions and explains the various types of justice
within a community. By focusing on his views regarding equity, which corrects
ambiguity or unforeseen consequences within laws and policies, an argument in support
of affirmative action can be made. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, equity is justice
administered according to fairness, as contrasted with strictly formulated rules (Black
1979, 484). I will argue that equity can be used to justify affirmative action by applying
the policy to particular individuals who have been or continue to be affected by racism,
rather than applying a general policy to all minorities.

’ In Joe Sachs’s translation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Sachs uses the term “decency” to describe
“equity” (epieikeia). He chooses to use decency because he believes that “equity” is misleading since
Aristotle is describing something that goes beyond what is equitable (Sachs 2002, 203). Sachs, Hamburger
and Sherman all use different terms to describe “equity.” This may occur because o f the varying dates of
publication. In my analysis of Book V, 1 will use the term “equity” rather than decency because of the
association between “equity” and a fair or just decision. In my references to Aristotle's works, all Bekker
numbers are cited, unless otherwise specified.
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The critical part of Aristotle's conception of justice involves the individual.
Throughout Book V he refers to the role actions play when determining justice. For
example, “the lawbreaker seems to be unjust, and so does someone who is greedy and
inequitable, and so it is clear that someone who is law-abiding and someone who is
equitable is just” (1129a 34-36). To distinguish between unjust and just actions, Aristotle
suggests using the mean, “which is a position equally apart from either extreme”
(1106a30- 30-31). Accordingly, if someone drives too aggressively or defensively she
may not be exercising the mean which could result in harm to one’s self or others.
In Book II, Aristotle discusses the mean and how it applies to an individual. He
maintains that in order to apply the mean, “it is always necessary for those who are acting
to look at the circumstance surrounding the occasion themselves”(lI04a7-9). “The mean
rests solely on the individual who at the time, considers the feelings and the reasons for
the sake of which, and the manner one ought to act” (1106b 19-24). Reliance on the
preceding factors pertains to things that are specific to a situation or individual with the
intention of choosing the best action at that time. He illustrates the particular application
of the mean to the art of steering a ship so that the mean helps guide individuals towards
just actions. Aristotle says that “the mean involves pleasure, which serves as a base for
actions, and pain that causes individuals to refrain from beautiful actions “(1104b8-10).
“When one chooses to follow things that lead to just actions, one is demonstrating his
ability to handle pleasure/pain well and an unjust action occurs when one handles
pleasure/pain badly” (1105a 11-14). However, he notes that a just act involves more than
simply performance. For Aristotle, a truly just action includes three things: “The first is to
act knowingly, and the next, having chosen the act and chosen it for its own sake, and the
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third, being in a stable condition and not able to be moved all the way out of it” (1105a
29-35). He describes the third condition to that of a toy which is able to bounce back after
being knocked over. Nevertheless, Aristotle asserts that all three conditions and the mean
must be exercised in order for an action to be truly just.
Aristotle then differentiates between complete and particular injustice. “When
someone throws her shield away and refuses to fight because of cowardice the action is
an illustration of complete injustice” (1130a 17). While the act may be unjust, it does not
result in the deprivation of another’s goods. On the other hand, when an individual takes
more than she deserves the action is a particular injustice. Aristotle explains that:
For both [particular and complete injustice] have their power in relation to
another person, but the one [particular] is concerned with honor or money
or safety, or some one thing if we had a name that includes all these, and is
for the pleasure that comes from gain, while the other is concerned with
everything that a serious person in serious about” (1130b 36-40).
Differentiating between particular and complete injustice allows him to establish criteria
for injustice.

“Thus what is unjust has been distinguished into the unlawful and the

inequitable, and the just into the lawful and equitable” (1130b8-9). Corrective justice and
civil penalties assign punishments based upon the act, while distributive justice uses
proportional distributions that allocate according to what is deserved proportionally or
equally (1131a 25-32). Applying Aristotle's theory, corrective justice involves numerical
equality through civil penalties depending on the act and distributive justice uses
proportional or equal distributions, which offer a more flexible type of justice because it
considers what is deserved. To emphasize the main component of justice, Aristotle states
that “there are no equal acts that are not at the same time lawful, so lawful is one of the
main characteristics of justice.” Hence, “rightly enacted law commands all virtues and
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forbids all vices” (1130b22-25) and it helps “educate its citizens, which results in the
development of the other virtues” (1130b 25-29). Therefore, “complete justice fosters
virtues through education and thus is not part of virtue but the whole of virtue, just as
injustice is the whole of the vice” (1130a 9-11). This shows Aristotle's belief in the
completeness that justice embodies.
Aristotle then turns to the discussion of the two types of particular justice. The
first is distributive, which involves “distributions of honor, or money, or as many other
things as are divisible, among those who share in the political community (for in these it
is possible both to have an unequal amount or one amount equal to another)” (1130b 3134). Under distributive justice, individuals may have both unequal and equal shares
within the community. For example, in today’s society Social Security payments are not
exactly the same amounts for everyone and this is considered fair. Thus, an unequal
share within society allows justice to occur because those who paid more into Social
Security receive more money than others who have not. Additionally, individuals can
have equal shares within the community such as when they vote. Citizen A ’s vote holds
equal weight to Citizen B and it is perceived as just. In this situation, distributions are
equal regardless of how citizens choose to allocate their votes.
The second type of particular justice is corrective justice, which includes private
transactions such as selling, buying or leasing. While the above examples of corrective
justice include willing exchanges, unwilling exchanges may occur such as robbery or
fraud. Corrective justice seeks to resolve a transaction that occurs privately through a
civil penalty imposed on those who perform an unjust deed. Aristotle concludes that the
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use of numerical equality, with regard to corrective justice, ensures that civil penalties are
just by assigning a punishment that considers the unjust act among other factors.
Distributive justice is an important part of the polis because it helps distribute
goods among its citizens. The mean, addressed in Book II, plays an essential role in
distributive justice because an unjust person is “inequitable and what is unjust is
inequitable” (1131a 10-11). To determine what is inequitable, one must apply the mean,
which represents a middle ground between two extremes. In order to establish the mean,
goods must somehow be proportional to one another. “Justice, therefore, is a certain kind
of proportion, for proportion is not merely something peculiar to numbers in arithmetic,
but belongs to a number in general, for proportionality is equality of ratios...”(1131a 3336). Ratios are important to proportionality because “the unjust person will have more
benefit or less burden, than his/her share while the one to whom the injustice is done has
less or more than his share” (1131b 19-20) and justice is achieved when the mean is used
to distribute goods proportionally.
Aristotle explains that corrective justice is attained when a judge uses the mean to
determine whether a penalty, fine or imprisonment is just or unjust. “The law is the
deciding force behind corrective justice, therefore it is for the judge to hit the mean of
justice” (1132a 20-23). The judge rectifies the situation and determines the mean by
considering the "loss" and "gain" that occurs in an exchange. Regardless of whether or
not the exchange is willing or unwilling, the judge will equalize the situation by adjusting
"loss" and "gain" (1132b 14-16). This reflects the fact that "loss" and "gain" are judged
through the examination of each case individually rather than by applying a universal rule
to all circumstances.
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A separate and independent aspect of particular justice is reciprocity. Reciprocity
does not include distributive or corrective justice, however it plays a fundamental role in
Aristotle's conception of justice because “it helps keep the polis together” (1131b 32-33).
Reciprocity pays back individuals proportionally but not equally. For instance, a
community needs a doctor and a farmer. While both are needed, their services may not
always be considered as being equal in importance. If the doctor does not need food she
will not look to the farmer, but when the doctor needs food the farmer plays an important
role in the process. “Thus through an exchange of services between the two the polis is
able to survive” (1133b 16-19). With regard to reciprocity, “justice occurs when
individuals receive what is proportionally equal, [or in other words fair] and similarly
with another person in comparison with someone else” (1134a 5-6).
Aristotle continues his discussion of justice by considering willing and unwilling
acts of justice. “Whenever one chooses to act in an unjust maimer she is committing an
injustice”(l 135b 20-26). He says that the capacity to judge an act of justice is a beautiful
ability and distinguishes between willing and unwilling acts that are forgivable. “If one
acts out of ignorance and shows remorse, that is forgivable” (1136a 7-9). Additionally,
he posits, “one who takes less or gives more without consideration is demonstrating an
act of beauty” (1136b 25). Aristotle reiterates that an act of justice involves more than
simply obeying the law. For him, the central component to justice is “knowing how
things are done and distributed” (1137a 14-16). Because the moral mean helps inform
individuals about distributions within the polis, Aristotle separates it from that of a
mathematical mean. The midpoint of zero and ten will always be five, yet the mean, as it
applies to individuals, cannot be universally applied. “The mean in relation to us, is what
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neither goes too far nor falls short, and this is not one thing nor the same thing for
everyone” (1106a 29-33). For that reason, a mathematical mean pertains to the universal,
while the moral mean involves a particular individual and guides one towards just acts.
Aristotle also asks the essential question: How does one implement laws that may
not be just to all members of the polis? He answers this through the use of equity. Every
law or policy applies to the universal, to all citizens equally. But it may not always be
applied in the same manner throughout time. Therefore, equity decisions are needed to
address any possible loopholes or injustices that may arise once the law or policy is
implemented. According to Aristotle, “this is the nature of what is decent [equity], a
setting straight of a law, in so far as it leaves something out as a result of being universal”
(1137b 27-29). Equity creates something better than a law or policy because it has the
ability to mend the law or policy once implemented. For example. Professor A is hired as
an assistant professor at the current market price o f $40,000. Three years later. Professor
B is hired as an assistant professor at the same university, but the market price has
increased to $45,000. During Professor A's three years at the university, she has
published several articles and received let us say, one and one-half percent per year salary
increase. Nonetheless, when Professor B is hired she is experiencing a "gain" over
Professor A because she automatically makes more than the professor who has three
years of experience at the same university. Professor A experiences a "loss" because she
has worked for the university for three years and deserves to have a higher salary than
Professor A who is just starting their career. In order to correct this inequity, the
university includes a line item in its annual budget, which ensures that when this situation
occurs Professor A 's "loss" will be corrected through a salary increase over Professor B.
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Lawmakers create laws or policies and equity exists to help address the problems, which
arise due to their general nature. Through equity an improved, more just outcome can be
implemented that has the capability to apply to a specific situation.
In summary, “An unjust act reflects upon one's self’ (1138a 14). One's ability to
find the mean helps determine where the fine line of justice is to be drawn. Distributive
justice is associated with the distribution of goods, while corrective justice involves the
use of civil penalties. Reciprocity exists to maintain the polis through proportional
exchanges among its citizens. Nevertheless, the key to justice is equity because it finetunes laws and policies that are unable to be applied to some situation, which would
otherwise create harmful unintended consequences. Before making an argument asserting
that affirmative action represents an equitable policy, I will interpret additional views on
Aristotle's concept.

Hamburger On the Origins of Equity
Max Hamburger has written several books on Aristotle and the foundations of
legal thought. In Morals and Law: The Growth o f Aristotle's Legal Theory,* he examines
the concept of equity. Hamburger begins by noting that Aristotle can claim sole and first
authority to defining the term epieikeia (equity or reasonableness) (Hamburger 1965, 93).
He explains that “a legal dynamic entails the correction, completion, alteration, and
adaptation of a law that does not automatically fit a practical case or is not compatible
with economic and social development” (Hamburger 1965, 91). In contrast, a legal static
refers to the inflexible nature of laws. He concludes that epieikeia is a legal dynamic
* Hamburger uses the term “epieikeia” in his writings and I will use the same word when citing his work.
The fust citation within the parenthetical reference is Hamburger’s and the preceding one is Aristotle’s
corresponding Bekker number.
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rather than a legal static because it is able to adjust laws or policies as needed.
Hamburger also cites early notions of epieikeia, which separate it from the law. He refers
to “Plato's use of the word in the Statesman and in the Laws, both of which use epieikeia
as something outside the sphere of positive law, a breaking away from right law”
(Hamburger 1965, 93). By outlining the original use of the term epieikeia. Hamburger
intends to show how Aristotle eventually redefines it to include something that is part of
law.
Hamburger On Equity In Magna Moralia
When Aristotle first addresses epieikeia, it continued to be viewed as something
separate from law. In Magna Moralia Aristotle discusses epieikeia in Book II Chapters I
and 2 (Hamburger 1965, 93). Influenced by Platonic teachings that distinguish epieikeia
from the law. Hamburger finds that Aristotle does not often refer to the term. Aristotle
addresses the issue of epieikeia from two angles: “the external aspect of action in the
sense of epieikeia and the inner aspect, the mental attitude of the one who acts equitably
discussed under the head of reasonableness” (Hamburger 1965, 93). He argues that
Aristotle believes that epieikeia is contrary to graspingness, which is taking more than the
law allows. Hamburger claims that Aristotle is attempting to link the functional and
material aspects of equity. In the words of Aristotle,
There are matters in which it is impossible for the lawgiver to enter into
exact details in defining, and where he has to content himself with a
general statement, then when a man gives way in these matters, and
chooses those things w hich he w ould have wished indeed to determine in
detail, but was not able to, such a man is equitable (Hamburger 1965, 96;
MM 1198b 27-30).
An equitable man is one who is willing to help address areas within a law where the
lawmaker fails to do so. However, Hamburger finds that Aristotle's first attempt to define
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epieikeia can be misleading. While he agrees with Aristotle's claim that epieikeia exists
to address inadequacies that arise out of the general application of laws, he argues that an
equitable person is not grasping if she demands more than the law would allow. For
Hamburger, “a problem occurs because Aristotle assumes that an inadequacy with the
law has no other meaning than to entitle a claimant to less than the law would give”
(Hamburger 1965, 94). He alleges “it is possible that the man who bases his claim on
epieikeia will be entitled to more than the law would justify in its inadequate and hence
inequitable formulation” (Hamburger 1965, 94). Therefore, he claims that one can take
more than the inadequate law would allow and may not be grasping because the law itself
does not provide enough for that individual. Agreeing with Aristotle's original assertion
that epieikeia serves as a correction of law. Hamburger is reinforcing his belief that the
term reflects its dynamic ability to adjust the law when needed. This is a fundamental part
of epieikeia because it establishes something that goes beyond the general application of
law.
Once Aristotle determines what comprises an equitable action, he then addresses
the internal sense of epieikeia and how it relates to reasonableness. Hamburger claims
that Aristotle's first attempt to discuss equity may demonstrate his desire to separate the
external and internal aspects of the term. He notes that in Nicomachean Ethics and
Rhetoric, Aristotle no longer tries to distinguish between the two senses, but combines
external and internal aspects into the concept of epieikeia.
Hamburger On Equity In Nicomachean Ethics
Hamburger's analysis of Nicomachean Ethics begins by considering the Latin
meanings of just and law. He observes “there is a predicament in defining the terms
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because ju s in Latin in this connection means droit, deritto, recht, i.e. law in the objective
sense, whereas law comprises both ‘Law’ -jus, and ‘the law’ -lex, loi, gesetz”
(Hamburger 1965, 96).

“Justice, in its nontechnical meaning, includes comprising

righteousness, lawfulness” (Hamburger 1965, 96). These definitions would create the
equation “law = justice.” Hamburger argues that "law = justice" cannot be a valid
equation because epieikeia corrects laws that are inadequate due to their general nature.”
This idea helps establish the most important concept of the term, which lies in the fact
that he [Aristotle] was the first to explain that epieikeia constitutes only the corrective
function of law, and is not something different from law (Hamburger 1965, 96)! Because
of this. Hamburger asserts that the importance of epieikeia cannot be overlooked and he
cites several countries that apply it within their legal codes (such as the Switzerland).
The first topic regarding epieikeia Aristotle highlights in Nicomachean Ethics is
the problem in separating it from the law, which can also be found in Plato's work.
Aristotle refers to the dilemma of distinguishing the two by stating, "If the just and the
equitable are different, they cannot both be good. If they are both good, they cannot at the
same time be different" (Hamburger 1965, 96; NE 1137b 4-5, 97). “This allows Aristotle
to combine them both and define epieikeia in its functional aspect as something not
different from law, but as the corrective function of law, as the corrective of legal justice”
(Hamburger 1965, 96). Law applies a general rule, which oftentimes prohibits it from
being applicable in a specific sense and when this occurs, epieikeia exists to make the
universal law apply to the particular situation. Hamburger maintains that equity, “as the
corrective o f law is needed to comply with the requirements of the particular case and
with absolute law, or justice in its highest and true sense” (Hamburger 1965, 98).
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While Hamburger does not say that equity is different than law, he does state that
if law and equity are good, equity is the better part of law.
This is how Aristotle puts the same idea:
...the equitable, though it is better than one kind of justice, yet is just, and
it is not as being a different class of thing that is better than the just [law].
The same thing, then, is just and equitable and while both are good the
equitable is superior (Hamburger 1965, 98).
Hamburger claims that the equitable is just because it completes the law’s purpose.
Equity allows for possible errors or omissions to be corrected, thus it represents
something better than law, which is associated with the universal and remains static.
Hamburger states, "And this is the nature of equitable, a correction of law where it is
defective owning to its universality" (Hamburger 1965, 98). In Book V of Nicomachean
Ethics, Aristotle fully addresses the functional aspect of equity as being that which
corrects laws.
Hamburger On Equity In Rhetoric
In Rhetoric, Aristotle considers the second component of epieikeia, which is the
material aspect or ability to define an equitable person. Hamburger starts his analysis by
citing that Aristotle divides law into two parts -municipal and universal. “Munieipal law
involves written laws and unwritten customs of a particular state and universal law is
identical to natural justice” (Hamburger 1965, 99; Rh. 1373b 1- 7). Aristotle examines
unwritten laws and distinguishes them into moral and legal spheres. “The moral sphere
includes the showing of gratitude towards benefactors, the repayments of their
benefaction, the helping of friends, and other acts of a similar nature” (Hamburger 1965,
100). Aristotle maintains that the moral sphere also reflects that of social opinion. In
contrast, the legal sphere of unwritten laws is concerned with inadequacies in particular
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or municipal law. “Thus equity is explained in its systematic origin and nature: It is part
of the wider concept of unwritten law which also comprises the unwritten law of moral
and social opinion” (Hamburger 1965, 100). By linking moral and social opinion to
equity, Aristotle is creating a unique standard for the equitable person. Hamburger notes
that while Aristotle does not specifically assert that equity and natural law are one in the
same, he does mention them both together, which may illustrate Aristotle's belief that the
two are closely related. After summarizing Aristotle's work in Rhetoric Hamburger
distinguishes the two parts of epieikeia into:
I) The functional aspect: Equity constitutes legal dynamics as against the
legal static and discharges the function of correction, completion or
adaptation where there is a gap or defect in the formulation of the law.
2) The material aspect: Equity entails fairness, humaneness,
reasonableness, and similar qualities (Hamburger 1965, 101).
Tracing the concept of epieikeia from its origins, and evaluating three works by Aristotle,
Hamburger is able to provide the reader with an in-depth analysis of Aristotle's work on
the concept.

Sherman On Equity
In The Fabric o f Character: Aristotle’s Theory o f Virtue, Nancy Sherman
analyzes Aristotle's concept of equity or fair-mindedness (epieikeia). She asserts that
although Aristotle acknowledges the necessary and legitimate place of rules, he
nonetheless steadily cautions against their intrinsic defects and dangers of over-rigorous
applications.^ Focusing on his discussion of equity, Sherman illustrates how the concept

®Sherman uses the term “equity” in her writings and I will use the same word when citing her work. The
first citation within the parenthetical reference is Sherman’s and the preceding one is Aristotle’s
corresponding Bekker number.
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allows for an ethical response to the problems that are created by the universal
application of laws. She notes, “Aristotle qualifies law, arguing that law is not
subordinate to a transcendent intelligence, but that law itself is intelligence; it has its own
rationality or logos” (Sherman 1989, 15; NE 1134a 29-32). Because law is not fixed or
rigid, it instead continuously evolves into something that represents a reasonable
decision. She cites Politics where Aristotle writes; "What is final is not the deliverance of
written law, but rather the best judgments of those who, guided by experience and the law
can improve upon it" (Sherman 1989, 15; Pol. 1287a25- 37). Sherman claims that
because of equity, law is flexible by nature and this addresses the limitation of law when
it is unable to be applied to a particular circumstance. “What it says in a general and
relatively unqualified way is always subject to further stipulation” (Sherman 1989, 15). In
the words of Aristotle, "To speak legally is to speak of general types leaving aside for
further consideration a more precise treatment of individual cases"(Sherman 1989, 15;
Pol. 1341b30-2).
After acknowledging the problem created through the universal application of
law, Sherman provides a more detailed discussion of equity. Its ability to apply to a
particular situation allows for the correction of law, which, in turn, makes equity better
than law. Aristotle elaborates this idea in Rhetoric:
The second kind o f [unwritten law] makes up for the defects of a
community's written code of law. This is what we call equity; people
regard it as just, it is in fact the sort of justice, which goes beyond the
written law. Its existence partly is and partly is not intended by legislators,
not intended where they have noticed no defect in the law; intended,
where they find themselves unable to define things exactly and or obliged
to legislate as if that held good always which in fact only holds good
usually; or where it is not easy to be complete owing to the endless
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possible cases presented, such as the kinds and sizes of weapons that may
be used to inflict wounds- a lifetime would be too short to enumerate all of
these. If, then, the law is imprecise and yet legislation is necessary, then
law must be expressed widely without restriction (Sherman 1989, 16; Rh:
I374a25-35, A® 1137b 20-S, Pol. I269a8-12)
Sherman cites several reasons why Aristotle believes equity should be applied. First, law
is essentially incomplete. Using Aristotle's example, a legislator is unable to list every
kind of weapon that could be used to commit murder. The incompleteness of law lies in
its inability to address every possible situation. Just as a lawmaker cannot list every
weapon used to kill, situations also arise that are not specifically covered under the law.
Second, one must consider the intent of the legislator when attempting to determine the
manner in which to apply the law. “Equity considers what the legislator would have said
himself, had he been present, and what he would have prescribed, had he known, in his
legislation” (Sherman 1989, 17; NE 1137b23). Equity includes legislative intent because
one must consider the goal of the legislator when interpreting the law. Third, equitably
interpreting the law may require going beyond the legislative intent, correcting for a
defect, which as Aristotle suggests above, the legislator did not anticipate (or perhaps
could not have anticipated (Sherman 1989, 18; Rh. I374a29). Sherman posits that equity
also includes looking beyond the intentions of the lawmaker as a check on the lawmaker
who may not consider every situation. Fourth, when there is no law that can be applied to
a case, equity requires the issuing of a decree.
The decree is indefinite then, not in the sense that it imprecisely
determines the requirements of the situation (for it does determine them
precisely), but in the sense that it does not determine or define a role for
other cases. A decree concerns actions about particulars (NE 1141 b28);
unlike a statute of law it is not possible to be universal (Sherman 1989, 18;
Pol. 1292a37, AE. 1134b24-25, 1094bll-27).
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In terms of application, a decree is different from law because it refers to a particular
instead of the universal. Accordingly, equity requires a decree to ensure that specific
situations are addressed. By outlining the four reasons why equity should be applied,
Sherman intends to show the important role it plays in Aristotle's work. Without equity,
nothing would be capable of applying or fine-tuning a law when it overlooks something
or accidentally causes harm once implemented.
Equity With Regard to Distribution of Punishments
Sherman then turns to the issue of equity as it relates to punishments. “It [equity]
is associated with considerateness and a disposition to show forgiveness, leniency or
pardon” (Sherman 1989, 18; AE 1143al9-24, 1135bI6-I136a9, 1110a24, Rh.l374b4-10).
“Thus equity requires one to consider all circumstances involved in the situation
including the person and how she has been or is usually”(Sherman 1989, 19; Rh
1374b 13-23). This concept can be seen today, as when an individual says that she is "out
of character" or does not "feel like herself today." Daily interactions with other
individuals create a perception of how one tends to act. But, when someone is not acting
like herself this is noticed by others. Thus, if someone commits a crime while out of
character, equity would acknowledge this and may allow for a more lenient punishment.
Certain circumstances and motives may also limit the responsibility of one's actions
under equity punishments. Aristotle explains,
A fuller consideration of circumstances and motives may reveal, for
exam ple, that an agent w hile making a voluntary choice w ith foreseen ill

consequences, is none the less not fully culpable for the choice was made
under duress, under conditions of a sort that over-strain human nature and
no one would endure (Sherman 1989, 19; NE 1110b25).
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Following Aristotle's argument, equity punishments would forgive or pardon individuals
if an unjust act is performed under force or stress. Equity would also limit the
responsibility of an individual if she commits a crime in order to protect one's family.
Aristotle argues that equity should be applied when deciding such punishments because
outside circumstances may play a role in the decision to commit a crime. More
specifically, “he differentiates accidents from errors of judgment in so far as the latter
may be cases of negligent ignorance, the former due to ill consequences, which the agent
could not reasonably have expected to foresee” (Sherman 1989, 19; Rh.l374b4-10, NE
1135bl2-1136a9). By considering what causes a person to act in an unjust manner, equity
helps ensure the fairest punishment. If such factors were not evaluated, laws would
impose punishments simply hased on the crime, without taking into account
circumstances that may lead one to act unjustly. Therefore, equity is applied to
punishments because it enables every case to be treated individually.
Not only should equity consider all of the circumstances involved when deciding
a punishment, but it should also evaluate the individual. “Civic law, Aristotle tells us,
ultimately derives from the considerations of virtue as a whole, and has to do with living
that is a productive part of it” (Sherman 1989, 18). For him, it is virtuous to be a
productive citizen within the polis. “This suggests that even when rules and
proceduralism have predominance, the notion of merely lawful actions that are right or
juridical but not virtuous, does not hold a comparably important place” (Sherman 1989,
18; NE 1136a9-25). One cannot simply follow laws and be considered virtuous because
it takes more than obeying a law to be virtuous. Determining whether someone is
virtuous or their type of character may be challenging, and that is why Aristotle believes
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equity should be a factor in such decisions and arbitration should be used to help evaluate
character. “Rather than applying strict litigation, arbitration is used to give fuller weight
to the considerations of equity” (Sherman 1989, 21; Rh. 1374bl8-22). Litigation, which
is used in corrective justice, usually centers on two parties with specific claims and is
concerned with righting the wrongs that are performed (by considering the "loss" and
"gain.").

Accordingly, “restoration considers not the agent, but the action, and the

cancellation of damages” (Sherman 1989, 21). Decisions under corrective justice do not
represent equity decisions because motives, circumstances and the individual’s ability to
pay the penalty are not considered. Corrective justice assumes that the court treats the
parties as equals.
For it makes no difference whether a good person has robbed a bad person
or a bad person a good one, nor whether it is a good or bad man that has
committed adultery; the law looks only at the different amounts of damage
in the injury (Sherman 1989, 21; NE 1132a3-24).
The key to corrective justice is its ability to impose civil penalties, which occur when the
judge seeks to hit the mean by considering "loss" and "gain." Aristotle notes that this may
appear as a drawback because corrective justice considers questions such as ability to pay
and the nature o f an action when deciding punishments. Nonetheless, he defends this
method because of the attention a judge pays to each case. He continues by stating that
the main attribute of an equitable person is that the person will choose to take less than
his share (Sherman 1989, 21; NE 1138al-3).
N ot a stickler for justice, one w ho is precise as to his rights is w illin g to

compromise the damages and forego the full restitution demanded by strict
corrective justice. The fair-minded person is willing to make allowances
(Sherman 1989, 21).
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An equitable person is flexible in nature, which means that she will not always demand
exactly what the law allows. Corrective justice issues civil penalties consistently based
upon the unjust act and quantity is the focal point of corrective justice. Litigation is used
to ensure that similar civil penalties are applied to corresponding situations. However,
Aristotle asserts that through arbitration equity decisions are rendered because character,
motive and circumstances are considered instead of simply "loss" and "gain."
Sherman continues her examination of arbitration and litigation in order to
reinforce the idea that arbitration reflects an equitable corrective decision. “The
arbitration process involves settlement through reconciliation rather than opposition and
open discussions instead of settled deed” (Sherman 1989, 21). In Book II of Politics,
Aristotle tells us “that arbitration, unlike litigation, involves the conferral and dialogue of
jurors, who deliberate with each other before voting. The result is a qualified verdict that
renegotiates the plaintiffs original demands” (Sherman 1989, 22; Pol. 1268b7). Through
discussion, arbitration achieves a more equitable decision because it provides a thorough
consideration of character, motive and circumstances. Moreover, it treats each case
individually and does not assume the same conditions for every situation. This allows for
equitable decisions because the punishment reflects equity in the sense that it focuses on
a particular case.
Sherman considers two aspects of equity: the first is as it applies to the process of
implementing laws and the second involves equity punishments. With regard to equity
within the law, Sherman emphasizes Aristotle's belief that the law is not final, because
equity ensures that laws are improved so that they can apply to a particular situation. The
general application of law serves as a limitation, which is why equity is used to enhance a

92

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

law and make it applicable to an individual circumstance. In relation to punishments,
Sherman cites Aristotle's work in Rhetoric in which he explains that character,
circumstances and motive should all be factors when determining a punishment. For him,
the arbitration process mirrors that of an equitable decision because it evaluates the
preceding factors. Sherman notes several reasons why Aristotle supports arbitration, but
most important to him is that it allows each case to be considered individually instead of
issuing a rubberstamp decision based on the unjust act.

An Overview of Equity
Individuals play a critical role in Aristotle’s concept of justice because they
usually create specific situations that require the equitable adjustment of a law. For
example, a handicapped person does not take the same driving test as one who is not
handicapped.

Instead, a handicapped individual receives a revised test that enables

him/her to take a test in spite of the disability. This idea is reinforced through Max
Hamburger’s consideration of Aristotle’s concept of equity, treating it as a legal dynamic
because of its flexible nature. Hamburger notes that eventually, Aristotle determines that
equity is the better part of law because it completes the law’s purpose.

Without equity,

the law remains incomplete. Moreover, Nancy Sherman analyzes Aristotle’s work on
equity and his assertion of equity as a “more precise treatment of individual cases.”
Sherman goes one step further by providing four reasons why Aristotle defends the use of
equity in his work.

First, law is essentially incomplete.

This idea is illustrated in

Aristotle’s example of a lawmaker’s inability to list every single murder weapon
possible. Second, equity considers the intention of the lawmaker when drafting the law.
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It looks at the legislative intent because if the law establishes unintended consequences,
an equitable adjustment must be made. Third, equitable decisions may sometimes require
one to go beyond legislative intent due to the difficulty for lawmakers to anticipate every
reaction a law creates. This also creates a check on lawmakers who may not consider
every single possible outcome. Finally, if no law can address the specific case, equity
requires the announcement and order addressing the particular finding. While a law is
typically universal in nature, an announcement or directive concerns an exact situation so
that without a law as a reference point, lawmakers have the option of issuing it under
certain conditions. Overall, it appears as if the primary goal of equity is to correct laws
that are general in nature so that they address particular situations citizens may face.

Conclusion: Equity and the Current Debate Over Affirmative Action
Grutter v. Bollinger 539 U.S. — (2003) involved a white Michigan resident,
Barbara Grutter who, after being denied admission into the University of Michigan Law
School, filed a lawsuit claiming that its affirmative action plan violates her right to Equal
Protection of Laws found in the Fourteenth Amendment. She argued that her rejection
occurred because race was used as the “predominant factor,” giving applicants who
belong to certain minority groups “a significantly greater chance of admission than a
student with similar credentials from disfavored groups” (539 U.S. — (2003), 5). The
controversy between Grutter and the law school is founded on the school’s
implementation of an affirmative action plan to increase diversity on campus. “The plan
targets a critical mass which is understood to represent a number that encourages
underrepresented minority students to participate in the classroom and not feel isolated”

94

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

(539 U.S. — (2003), 5).

While the law school does not use a specific number to

determine whether or not it achieved a “critical mass,” it did consider race when it sought
to attain a “critical mass.” According to the Dean of the Law School, “m some cases an
applicant’s race may play no role, while in others it may be a determinative factor” (539
U.S. — (2003), 5). In addition to race, the policy considered a number of other factors.
So called “soft variables” such as enthusiasm of recommenders, the
quality of the undergraduate institution, the quality of the applicant’s
essay, and the areas of difficulty of undergraduate course selection are all
brought to bear in assessing an applicant’s likely contributions to the
intellectual and social life of the institution (539 U.S. — (2003), 5).
“Soft variables” allowed the law school to not exclusively use race in its decision to
admit a student. This collegial decision by the law school is demonstrated in its goal of
achieving a “critical mass” through the use of “soft variables,” which enables the
admissions board to review each applicant as an individual. For those applying to the law
school, the limited number of seats represents a social good that provides additional
training, skills and education that help one get ahead in life. On one side of the debate is
Grutter, who maintains that the affirmative action plan is wrong because it considers race
when making a decision to accept a student. On the other, is the law school, which
asserts that its goal of a diverse student body through the use of “critical mass” and “soft
variables” enhances the educational experience of its students because other viewpoints
and experiences are preserved.
Does the affirmative action plan at the University of Michigan Law School
represent an equitable policy? When the Supreme Court upheld the affirmative action
plan the majority opinion stated:
The hallmark of that policy is its focus on academic ability coupled with a
flexible assessment of applicants’ talents, experiences, and potential to
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contribute to the learning of those around them. The policy requires
admission officials to evaluate each applicant based on all the information
available in the file, including a personal statement, letters of
recommendation, and an essay describing the ways in which the applicant
will contribute to the life and diversity of the Law School (539 U.S. —
(2003), 4).
This opinion reflects several important components of Aristotle’s concept of equity.
First, particular judgments are made under the law school affirmative action plan because
each applicant is evaluated on an individual basis.

Using factors besides strictly

quantitative data such as test scores and grade point averages, the law school applies a
case by case assessment of each applicant through the consideration of a variety of “soft
variables” when determining admittance into its program. Second, the law school plan is
flexible meaning it allows admissions officials to look at a variety of factors when
making its decision.

Grutter argued that her test scores exceeded many minority

applicants who were admitted, but the law school considers qualities beyond strictly
numbers, thereby making it an equitable policy. Aristotle maintains that the downfall
with enacting laws is that the universal application creates an inability to adapt to specific
situations. To address this problem, he posits that equity can be applied to fine-tune
loopholes within the law, which helps to complete the intent or purpose of the law. The
flexible nature of equity allows it be dynamic and change as needed just as the law school
affirmative action plan considers a variety of “soft variables” for each applicant rather
applying rigid standards. Overall, O’Connor applies Aristotle’s notion of equity when
upholding the law school affirmative action plan because o f its individualized and

flexible approach that has the ability to address particular situations
The idea of implementing an equitable affirmative action plan was first illustrated
in Justice Powell’s opinion in the University o f Regents v. Bakke (1978). Before this
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decision, universities applied strict quotas or “set-asides” to achieve minority
representation on campus. These represented abstract, universal affirmative action plans
that conveyed admission to whole classes of persons. But, in his concurring opinion,
Powell wrote that the key to a fair or just affirmative action plan is flexibility.
A university’s admissions program must remain flexible enough to ensure
that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that
makes an applicant’s race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her
application. The importance of this individualized consideration in the
context of race-conscious admissions programs is paramount (539 U.S. —
(2003), 15).
Twenty-five years later, in Grutter, the Court applied the same logic as Justice Powell in
Bakke who cited the key aspects of equity when defending affirmative action in higher
education. Both the Bakke and Grutter decisions supported affirmative action plans that
apply an individualized and flexible approach. The affirmative action plans matched that
of Anistotle’s concept of equity because he too criticizes laws and policies that are rigid
and he advocates the use of equity to address this issue. The dynamic nature of equity is
found in the law school’s willingness to look at a variety of factors for admission that go
beyond race. The plan includes two critical aspects of Aristotle’s idea of equity. First,
the flexible nature of the affirmative action plan is achieved through the use of a “critical
mass” in place of strict quotas or set-asides. Second, individual examination of each
application is attained with “soft variables” that consider various qualities possessed by
each applicant. For Aristotle, these two aspects work together to produce an affirmative
action plan that is equitable and just. The flexible and individualized approach in the law

school plan considers numerous aspects of every applicant, which applies to the
particular individual rather than the universal (a group within society). By focusing on
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the individual, this equity adjustment allows affirmative action to become a more fair and
just policy.
According to Aristotle’s definition of particular justice, there are two ways to
allocate goods. The first is equally, which mirrors the concept of one-person one vote.
Grutter maintained that admission should be determined equally which mandates all
those who have specific test scores or GPAs receive acceptance into the program. This
notion dictates that equal allocations should correspond with the number of available
seats into the program. For example, if Student A and Student B both have the same test
scores and grade point averages, both should gain admission.

Under this example,

admission officials would look at the same factors for everyone and base acceptance on
achievement of those factors.

The second way to distribute justice is proportionally,

which allows distributions to occur based on a variety of factors.

Social Security

represents a proportional distribution because those who have contributed more money
receive more than others who have given less. Not every applicant comes from the same
background, and proportional distribution makes equity adjustments to address this. In
the admissions process, affirmative action allows for equitable adjustments by taking into
account the differences individuals may possess in family, education, and community
involvement. The policy follows Aristotle’s idea of equity because it considers a variety
of factors and recognizes that each applicant comes from a particular background. This
individualized and flexible approach enables affirmative action to be regarded as an
equitable and just policy.

Future framings of affirmative action lawsuits and court

decisions would benefit by a more widespread consideration of Aristotle’s concept of
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equity as the completing and finest level of adjudication for the sake, not only of
procedural, but also of substantive justice.
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